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INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress, as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996,' amended the list of noncommercial tort
exceptions to sovereign immunity2 in the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act ("FSIA").3 This legislative action came in response to a
federal court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over Libya and alleged Libyan terrorists in Smith v. Socialist Peo-
ple's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,4 one of many cases resulting from the
terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
2. See infra notes 237-244 and accompanying text (listing the exceptions to
sovereign immunity).
3. Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 U.S.C. secs. 1602-1611
(1994).
4. 101 F.3d 239 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997).
5. See infra note 265 and accompanying text (discussing the factual back-
ground of the bombing of Pam Am Flight 103). The event also resulted in two
other significant lawsuits. See also In re Air Disaster, 37 F.3d 804 (2d Cir. 1994)
(recounting how the families of the victims won a massive $500 million lawsuit
against Pan Am in 1994 for allowing the bomb to be slipped aboard the plane); see
Leslie McKay, Note, A New Take On Antiterrorism: Smith v. Socialist People 's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 439, 440-41 (1997) (discussing
the monetary rewards of Flight 103). The second lawsuit involved the two Libyan
suspects, Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, both former Lib-
yan intelligence agents who surrendered in April 1999, thereby ending seven years
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The ambiguously worded' amendment appears to give federal courts
both subject matter jurisdiction, which Congress clearly intended,
and personal jurisdiction over the seven nations currently listed by
the Executive Branch as "state sponsors of terrorism."' The United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, the only
court to address the amended FSIA, unconstitutionally interpreted it
as according the court personal jurisdiction over Libya in the refiled
suit by the survivors, executors, administrators, and personal repre-
sentatives of those killed over Lockerbie.'
This Article will demonstrate that giving the court personal juris-
diction over a foreign sovereign simply because the Executive
Branch has concluded that it is a "state sponsor of terrorism" or be-
cause an offshore terrorist act had some "effect" in the United States
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment' ab-
of United Nations sanctions against Libya. The two are currently being held in the
Netherlands, where they will be tried under Scottish law for human rights viola-
tions. See Aphrodite Thevos Tsairis, Lessons of Lockerbie, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & CoM. 31 (1996) (describing the efforts of the families of the victims).
6. See 45 AM. JuR. 2D INT'L LAW sec. 83 (1999), citing Gibbons v. Udaras na
Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that the FSIA has been
characterized as obtuse, creating numerous interpretive questions due to its bizarre
structure and its many deliberately vague provisions). Perhaps those responsible
for drafing the FSIA can be partially excused since "[p]rior to the enactment of the
FSIA in 1976, United States law on sovereign immunity bordered on the incoher-
ent." See McKay, supra note 5, at 445 (quoting Belsky et al., Implied Waiver Un-
der the FSI: A Proposed Exception for Immunity for fiolation of Peremptory
Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REv. 365, 368 (1989). See also Hugel v.
McNeil, 886 F.2d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction, and
specifically the constitutionality of State application of long-arm statutes, is a topic
which over the years has puzzled first year students and learned jurists alike.").
7. Those states are Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria.
8. See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F. Supp. 325
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting the court jurisdiction over the defendants).
9. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496-97
(1983) (discussing how the FSIA creates federal question jurisdiction invoking the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth, rather than the Fourteenth, Amendment). The
analysis of personal jurisdiction under International Shoe Co. v. Washington and
its progeny is the same under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, other than the
fact that under the Fifth Amendment one need not "address concerns of interstate
federalism." See L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F.
Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d
290, 293-95 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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sent the performance of traditional "minimum contacts" analysis Lin-
der both the specific and general personal jurisdiction tests.
I. CONCEPTS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
This section of the Article briefly examines concepts of personal
jurisdiction under international law '° and then addresses the central
issue of the concept of personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. First, this Section
reviews the general idea of personal jurisdiction as articulated in
such cases as International Shoe Co. v. Washington," McGee v. In-
ternational Life Ins. Co.,'2 Hanson v. Denckla,'3 Kulko v. Superior
Court of Cal.,'4 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson," Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz16 and Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court of Cal..'7 Next, this Section focuses on the Calder v. Jon es"
line of "effects" cases, upon which the government'" and the plain-
tiffs0 rely heavily in arguing personal jurisdiction in Rein v. Socialist
People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.2' Finally, it looks at the concept of
general personal jurisdiction first articulated in Helicopteros Nacion-
ales de Colombia v. Hall."
10. Because this Article focuses on the constitutionality of the FSIA as applied,
discussion of the applicable international norms is purposefully truncated.
11. 326U.S. 310(1945).
12. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
13. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
14. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
15. 444 U.S. 286 (1979).
16. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
17. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
18. 465 U.S. 783 (1983).
19. Government Brief in Rein [hereinafter "Government Brief"].
20. Plaintiff's Brief in Rein [hereinafter "Plaintiff s Brief'].
21. 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
22. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Federal courts have noted five bases for jurisdiction under inter-
national laxv:2 terrtorial;' nationalty;- protective;2" universality;"
and passive personality. According to the passive personality princi-
ple, a state has jurisdiction over anyone who injures one of its na-
tionals, notwithstanding location.2
Whether the theory that an act of airplane bombing over Scotland
or the high seas is an act that terrorizes persons in the United States
or seeks to alter United States foreign policy is a valid extension of
Calder, personal jurisdiction can be invoked under both the national
and protective bases of international personal jurisdiction.' Moreo-
23. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899-900 (D.C. 1988) (dis-
cussing and explaining the five principles, while concentrating on universality and
passive personality). The five principles were first articulated by a Harvard Re-
search Project in 1935 and have been followed by a number of federal courts. Har-
vard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935) (creating principles for finding jurisdiction under
international law); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) (discussing how federal
courts have a history of finding liability based on international law); Chua Han Mo
v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985)
(denying lack of jurisdiction solely because criminal acts were committed abroad);
Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967)
(finding that the court had jurisdiction to try aliens for conspiracy to smuggle her-
oin into the United States).
24. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 899 (explaining how, under the territorial princi-
ple, jurisdiction is proper in the nation where the offense is committed).
25. See id. (explaining how, under the nationality principle jurisdiction is based
upon the nationality of the defendant).
26. See id. at 900 (discussing how, under the protective principle, jurisdiction is
proper in a nation whose national interest is injured).
27. See id. (discussing how, under the universality principle, jurisdiction is
proper in any nation that gains physical custody over the perpetrator "of certain
offenses considered particularly heinous and harmful to humanity").
28. See id. (stating how, under the passive personality principle, jurisdiction is
proper in any nation whose nationals have been injured, regardless of the location
of the crime or tort).
29. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 900-01 (discussing the universality principle in
the context of aircraft piracy and hostage-taking). Were the defendants in physical
custody in the United States, they would arguably be subject to jurisdiction for
both the civil tort case and the criminal case under the universality principle.
2000]
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ver, the passive personality theory is an appropriate basis for juris-
diction under either the extended the Calder theory or, more simply,
based on the fact that more than one hundred United States nationals
were killed in the bombing. The passive personality principle, al-
though the least favored by international scholars of the five princi-
ples of jurisdiction, ° is internationally recognized as legitimate and is
accepted by United States courts.3'
B. SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION
This section addresses the modem personal jurisdiction cases,
from International Shoe to Asahi Metal. As this is a component of
Civil Procedure, the material is presented as briefly as possible,
commensurate with setting the stage for analysis of its application to
the FSIA.32
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington," the Court stated:
30. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of
Terrorism and Nonimmunity for Foreign Violators of International Law Under the
FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine, 23 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 191 (1983) (arguing that,
"U.S. federal courts should decline jurisdiction where it rests solely on the passive
personality principle").
31. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 901-03 (noting that the government also invoked
the passive personality principle in seeking to extradite the leader of the terrorists
who hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise ship and killed American tourist Leon
Klinghoffer); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984)
(stating that "[t]he nationality of the victims, who are United States government
agents, clearly supports jurisdiction."); Gerald P. McGinley, The Achille Lauro
Affair-Implications for International Law, 52 TENN. L. REv. 691, 712-13 (1985)
(discussing how changing circumstances have strengthened the principle as a basis
for jurisdiction). But see United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 215 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (criticizing the personality principle but not reaching the question of whether
it was valid because jurisdiction was established under three other principles). The
United States did reject the principle, as applied by Mexico, against an American
author of an article which was published in a Texas newspaper and which was
critical of a Mexican citizen. The Cutting Case, 1887 FOR. REL. 751 (1888) (re-
ported in J.B. Moore Digest of International Law 232-40 (1906)).
32. See generally David C. Tunick, Up Close and Personal: A Close-Up Look
at Personal Jurisdiction, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1157 (1996) (providing an ex-
haustive explication of the personal jurisdiction cases).
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The International Shoe Company was a Delaware
corporation with headquarters in Missouri. It had no offices in Washington state.
Washington state enacted an unemployment compensation scheme that included
400 [15:395
2000] STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he not be present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend traditional notions offair play and substantial justice. U
After reviewing the various factors favoring" and opposing juris-
diction,3 6 the Court stated that where the activities have been con-
tinuous and systematic and have given rise to the liabilities sued
upon, personal jurisdiction will be constitutionally permissible.'
7
Casual presence, however, or single or isolated activities are not
enough for causes of action unconnected to the activities." The Court
held that personal jurisdiction must be based upon certain "minimum
contacts" which cannot be judged simply in a mechanical or quanti-
tative way.39 Rather, the court must look at the quality and nature of
the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of laws.'
The Court also noted that the corporation enjoyed the benefits and
employer contributions based on a percentage of wages paid for employee services
performed in the state. In the case of delinquent payments, notice was given by
service upon the employer. Alternatively, notice was given to absent employers by
registered mail to the last known address. International Shoe received service by
personal service upon a sales solicitor employee in Washington and by registered
mail to the correct address. There was a Commission hearing at which Interna-
tional Shoe put in a special appearance. The Commissioner, the trial court and state
Supreme Court all upheld the validity of the service of process. See id. at 311-13
(summarizing the material facts).
34. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940) (emphasis added).
35. See id. at 313-15 (noting that the corporation designated an attorney for the
State Unemployment Commissioner; it employed 11-13 salesmen under its direct
supervision and control and paid them S31,000 a year and paid for permanent sam-
ple rooms in the state, thereby availing itself of privileges in the state).
36. See id. at 313 (realizing that the company was incorporated in Delaware; its
principal place of business was Missouri; it had no sales units or branches inside
the state; it apparently had no actual agent designated for service of process; it
maintained no inventory in the state; it made no contracts in the state and its
salesmen had no authority to make contracts on its behalf in the state).
37. See id. at 317 (stating that there needs to be a "presence" within the state as
measured by the corporation's actions and dealings in the state).
38. Seeid. at318.
39. See International Shoe, 326 U.S at 319 (stating that the test is not whether
the activity was a little more or less, rather the test is more qualitative than quanti-
tative).
40. See id.
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protections of the state's laws when conducting activities within the
state.4' The Court concluded that in the present case the activities
were neither irregular nor casual, but were systematic and continu-
ous.42 Further, the obligation sued upon arose out of the activities
used to establish the necessary "minimum contacts.,
43
In McGee,44 California claimed jurisdiction based upon its Unau-
thorized Insurer's Process Act.45 The plaintiff obtained a default
judgment in California and tried to enforce it in Texas, but the Texas
court held that the judgment was unenforceable. 6 Even though a
number of factors argued against personal jurisdiction, 7 the Supreme
Court applied the International Shoe test and found the contacts were
systematic and continuous, not merely irregular and casual.48 The
Supreme Court explained that its holding was based upon the trend
toward expanding the scope of states' jurisdiction because of the in-
ternationalization of commerce.4 9 The Supreme Court held it was suf-
ficient that the suit was based on a contract that had a substantial
41. See id. (emphasizing that the exercise of receiving benefits and protections
may give rise to obligations on corporations to respond to suits brought against it).
42. See id. at 320 (noting that International Shoe's activities resulted in a large
volume of interstate business through which the appellant received benefits and
protections of state laws, which included their right to resort to the courts to en-
force their rights).
43. See id. (finding that the corporation's benefits established sufficient con-
tacts and it was only "fair play" and "substantial justice" for the state to enforce its
obligations to protect the rights of its residents).
44. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
45. CAL. INS. CODE secs. 1610-1620 (1953).
46. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 288 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Civ. App.
1957) (stating that the California state court did not have jurisdiction because the
corporation did not do business in California).
47. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 221-22 (realizing that the company had no office
or agent in California; it engaged in no other soliciting or insurance business in
California and it was actually a prior corporation from Arizona that issued the
policy).
48. See id. at 222 (stating that due process only requires an out-of-state defen-
dant to have "minimum contacts" with the state to be subject to judgment in perso-
nam).
49. See id. (discussing the expanding power states have over foreign companies
and non-residents in transforming the national economy).
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connection with California.50 Finally, the Court considered it impor-
tant that California had an interest in the outcome, there were defense
witnesses in California, and there was no significant inconvenience
to the insurer.'
In Hanson,52 Dora Donner of Pennsylvania created a trust with a
Delaware bank as the trustee. 3 The trust assets were kept in Dela-
ware. 4 Donner then moved to Florida." There was an unrelated law-
suit in Florida in which the defendants raised the issue that the trus-
tee was an indispensable party and that suit could not go forward
because Florida had no jurisdiction over Hanson." The Florida court
held that it had jurisdiction and found for the plaintiff." The Dela-
ware court refused to give full faith and credit5' to the Florida action
because it believed that Florida did not have personal jurisdiction
over the trustee. 9 The Supreme Court was called upon to review the
trustee's contacts with Florida, namely that for eight years while
Donner lived in Florida she regularly communicated with the trustee
50. See id. at 223 (explaining that a California resident delivered the contract
and mailed the premiums).
51. See id. (recognizing that residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they
were forced to follow the insurance company to a distant state to bring an action,
especially if they could not afford to pay travel and lodging expenses).
52. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
53. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 238 (stating that under the trust agreement, Mrs.
Donner could change the trustee and could also revoke, alter or amend the agree-
ment at any time).
54. See id. (noting that the trust assets were in Delaware because the Delaware
bank was incorporated there).
55. See id. at 239 (explaining that Donner remained in Florida until her death).
56. See id. at 238 (affirming that Florida could not get jurisdiction over the
Delaware trustee, Donner's daughter, an indispensable party).
57. See id. at 241-42 (recognizing the Chancellor's ruling that he lacked juris-
diction over a non-resident defendant because there was no personal service and
the trust corpus was outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court).
58. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, sec. 1 (defining how full faith and credit should be
given in each state to public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other
state).
59. See id., 357 U.S. at 243 (providing the court's reasoning).
2000] 03
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and paid him for his efforts.60 As this was the only contact asserted,
the Court held that it was an insufficient basis for personal jurisdic-
tion.6' The Court focused on Donner's unilateral activity of moving
to Florida after establishing the arrangement with the trustee." The
Court stated that the defendant must "purposefully avail" itself of the
privilege of conducting business in the state.63
In Kulko,64 although Mr. Kulko's only contact with California was
buying his daughter a one-way plane ticket there, the California state
court held that it had jurisdiction.6 ' The California Supreme Court
upheld the appellate court's reasoning that by consenting to his chil-
dren's living in California, Mr. Kulko had "caused an effect in th[e]
state. 66 In reversing, however, the Supreme Court reiterated its re-
quirement of purposeful availment.67 The Court also discussed fair-
ness in its finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction.68
60. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-51 (emphasizing that in order for a state to
obtain jurisdiction over non-residents, the non-resident must have "minimum con-
tacts" with that state).
61. See id. at 251 (explaining how the defendant trust company had no offices
in Florida nor did they transact any business there).
62. See id. at 262 (showing that none of the trust assets had ever been held or
administered in Florida).
63. See id. at 243 (imposing the "purposeful availment" standard); cf id. at
256-64 (Black, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the mere business relationship es-
tablished when Donner moved to Florida was enough to create personal jurisdic-
tion).
64. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
65. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 564 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1977) (arguing that the
holding is reasonable because Mr. Kulko "purposely availed" himself of the bene-
fits and protections of California by sending his daughter there).
66. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 89, citing 133 Cal. Rptr. 627, 628 (1976) (asserting
that causing an effect in California was sufficient grounds for the state to obtain
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Kulko).
67. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 94 (holding that Mr. Kulko did not purposefully
avail himself by sending his daughter to California and consenting for her to live
there). The Court explained that Mr. Kulko acted in the best interest of his children
and family. Id. Furthermore, the Court contending that all child support issues
pertaining to the divorce would best be handled by New York courts).
68. See id. at 97 (stating that the action against Mr. Kulko did not arise out of a
benefit of interstate commerce, but from domestic relations).
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In World-Wide Volkswagen Coip. v. Woodson," the Robinsons
first bought an Audi from Seaway Volkswagen ("Seaway") in New
York, and subsequently decided to move to Arizona. They were in-
volved in a car accident in Oklahoma, in which their car caught on
fire and three family members were burned. ' The Robinsons filed
suit7 under products liability claiming defective design." World-
Wide Volkswagen ("World-Wide") was incorporated in and had its
business office in New York.74 There was no evidence of any busi-
ness relationship with Oklahoma, as this multi-state enterprise in-
cluded only the states of Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York."
Likewise, there was no evidence that Seaway had any business rela-
tionship with Oklahoma, since it was a local retailer, incorporated in
and with its principal place of business in New York. 6 The Okla-
homa Supreme Court, nevertheless, held there was jurisdiction over
both Seaway and World-Wide." The court reasoned that the product
was by its very design and purpose so mobile that World-Wide could
foresee its possible use in Oklahoma.78
69. 444 U.S. 286 (1979).
70. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 288 (discussing the facts of
the case).
71. See id. (explaining that the Robinsons' car was hit in the rear).
72. See id. (naming the defendants in the suit: Audi, the German manufacturer,
Volkswagen of America, the importer, World-Wide Volkswagen, the regional dis-
tributor, and Seaway, the retailer). Audi and Volkswagen of America do business
in every state, including Oklahoma, but World-Wide and Seaway put in special
appearances to argue lack ofjurisdiction. See id.
73. See id. at 288 (explaining the theory of liability).
74. See id. at 288-89 (discussing the residency of the corporation).
75. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 289 (explaining there was no
showing that any "automobile sold by World-Wide or Seaway entered Oklahoma,
except for the car involved in this case").
76. See id. at 289 (noting that neither World-Wide nor Seaway ship or sell any
products to Oklahoma, have any agents there or advertise there).
77. See id. at 289-90, citing 585 P.2d 351 (1978) (holding that Oklahoma's
"long arm statute" allowed the court to have personal jurisdiction over World-
Wide and Seaway).
78. See id. at 294 (contending that Seaway and World-Wide could foresee the
car possibly being used in Oklahoma because cars are used to engage in the flow
of commerce, which includes interstate commerce and travel).
20001
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The Supreme Court reversed as to both parties. 79 First, it reaf-
firmed the "minimum contacts" test set forth in International Shoe."'
It then stated that the test had two functions: (1) protecting the de-
fendant from an inconvenient forum; and (2) setting the limits of
state sovereignty in the federal system.' The phrase "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice," addressed the fairness
prong.82 Citing McGee, the Court noted how this branch had been
"substantially relaxed over the years" due to changes in the Ameri-
can economy.83 As in Hanson, however, the Court stated that even if
the forum is not inconvenient, sovereignty provides a boundary to
the growth of a state's reach.84 Consequently, the Court found noth-
ing that would convey personal jurisdiction.8"
The Supreme Court rejected the foreseeability analysis of the state
court.86 The issue, the Court said, was purposeful availment.87 Juris-
diction may be proper if a corporation places products in the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
88consumers in the forum state.
79. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 (reversing the decision of the
appellate court).
80. See id. (determining that a state may only assert jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant if "minimum contacts" exist).
81. See id. at 292 (discussing the purposes of the "minimum contacts" require-
ment).
82. See id. (requiring the defendant's contacts with the forum state be substan-
tial enough to maintain the suit).
83. See id. at 292-93 (citing McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-23) (attributing the re-
laxation of the fairness branch largely to the fundamental changes in the economy).
84. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293 (stating the sovereignty of
each state implies a limitation on the sovereignty of other states).
85. See id. at 295 (finding no circumstances which would justify state-court ju-
risdiction).
86. See id. (holding that foreseeability alone has never been a benchmark for
personal jurisdiction).
87. See id. at 297 (noting that when a corporation purposefully avails itself of
activities in the forum state, it has notice it is subject to suit there and can act to
alleviate the risk of litigation).
88. See id. at 297-98, (citing Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961)) (finding that a forum state is within its Due Proc-
ess Clause powers if it asserts jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its prod-
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World-Wide Volkswagen created a two-tier analysis." First is the
sovereignty tier, which grew out of Hanson and which was rooted in
Pennoyer v. Neff.90 Second is the convenience tier, which grew out of
McGee.9' The sovereignty tier, representing the line from Interna-
tional Shoe to Hanson, requires determining whether the defendant
purposely brought itself into contact with the forum state. 2 The
Court implied that if this test is met, the next steps involve looking at
the convenience to the plaintiff, the convenience to the defendant, the
interests of the state and other factors.9" If there is serious inconven-
ience, there can be no jurisdiction. Since the sovereignty test was
not met in World-Wide, however, no analysis of the convenience
branch took place on those facts.9
In Burger King v. Rudzewicz,9 Justice Brennan provided a more
clear-cut articulation of the two-part test that had evolved in previous
cases. 97 In this case, the plaintiff, Burger King, was a Florida corpo-
ucts into the stream of commerce of that jurisdiction).
89. See generally World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294, citing Interna-
tional Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 (emphasizing that the reasonableness of asserting ju-
risdiction must be assessed using the context of the federal system and in the or-
derly administration of laws).
90. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1878) (distinguishing federal
from state courts).
91. See generally McGee, 355 U.S. at 223-24 (using convenience as a factor in
finding jurisdiction in a contested state forum).
92. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S.
250-51) (determining that the "minimum contacts" test is not an immunity from
inconvenience, but rather a consequence of limitations on states).
93. See id. (stating that even if the defendant would not be inconvenienced by
being brought into the forum, due process may remove the state's ability to render
a valid judgment).
94. See id. (providing examples of when a state may not have jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant).
95. See id. at 295-99 (applying the minimum contacts test and finding that the
required contacts did not exist).
96. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
97. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-78 (discussing the Supreme Court deci-
sions establishing the "minimum contacts" and convenience tests for determining
whether to assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant).
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ration with its principal office in Miami. 9 The contract awarding the
two defendants a Burger King franchise in Michigan contained a
choice of law provision that stated that Florida law governed. 9  Fran-
chise payments and notices were mailed to Florida." One partner
even went to seminars in Florida.' °' Both defendants, however, were
from Michigan.' 2
The dispute arose when, after several disagreements and pro-
tracted negotiations, Burger King terminated the defendants' fran-
chise and ordered Rudzewicz and MacShara to vacate the building.'0 '
They refused and continued to operate as a Burger King.' °  Burger
King filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. ,05
In analyzing the Court's decision, Justice Brennan made six major
points. First, the defendants purposefully directed their actions to-
ward Florida. 0 6 Second, Florida had a manifest interest in protecting
its residents.' 7 Third, modem transportation made it more convenient
for the defendants to defend themselves in Florida.' 8 Fourth, the
98. See id. at 464-66 (providing relevant information about Burger King Cor-
poration).
99. See id. at 480 (providing the text of the provision and discussing the rela-
tive weight such provisions should be afforded).
100. See id. (asserting that the contract documents directed all relevant payments
and notices be sent to Miami).
101. See id. at 466 (noting that the defendant MacShara attended the required
management courses in Miami).
102. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464-67 (summarizing the defendants' claim
that because they were residents of Michigan, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida could not assert personal jurisdiction).
103. See id. at 468 (describing the events that led to the suit).
104. See id. (noting the defendant's refusal to cooperate with Burger King's re-
quest).
105. See id. (basing jurisdiction on diversity, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1332(a), and the
fact that the case involved a federal trademark dispute, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1328(a)).
106. See id. at 473 (noting that a court may legitimately exercise jurisdiction
only when the defendant directs his activities toward residents of the forum).
107. See id. (providing for protection in the form of a convenient forum).
108. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (noting modem transportation and com-
munication have eased the burden of litigation in another forum).
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"constitutional touchstone" remained "minimum contacts.'"" Fifth,
foreseeability alone was not a "sufficient benchmark.""' Finally, the
defendant must "purposefully avail" himself through contacts that
create a substantial connection; benefits and protections of state's
laws."
Then Justice Brennan clearly stated the new two-tier test implicit
in World-Wide: first, the "minimum contacts" or sovereignty test,
second, the "fair play and substantial justice" test. "2 The factors in-
clude: the burden on the defendant; the forum state's interest in adju-
dicating the dispute; the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient
and effective relief; the interstate judicial system's interest in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared
interest in the several states in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies."'
Justice Brennan then stated that an individual's contract with an
out of state individual alone could not create jurisdiction in the other
party's home state," 4 but found sufficient other factors to find juris-
109. See id. 474 (noting that a "minimum contacts" analysis is fundamental to
establish jurisdiction).
110. See id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295) (noting that fore-
seeability of injury in the forum state is insufficient to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion).
111. See id. at 474-75 (requiring "purposeful availment" to ensure jurisdiction is
not based on "random", "fortuitous", or "attenuated" contacts). The Court cited
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984), but not Calder. See id.
Calder is cited only for the proposition that lack of physical presence in the state
does not prevent jurisdiction where the actor's efforts are "purposefully directed"
toward the state's residents. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (discussing the crite-
ria for personal jurisdiction).
112. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at
320) (noting that once minimum contacts have been established, other factors
should be considered to ensure the exercise of jurisdiction is fair).
113. See id. at 476-77, citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
114. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-79 (rejecting a "mechanical" test and
emphasizing a "highly realistic approach" that realized a contract as the culmina-
tion of business negotiations). Cf McGee, 355 U.S. at 233 (holding that jurisdic-
tion existed based on a single contract that had a substantial connection with the
forum state). Burger King did not overrule, but rather, as the First Circuit ex-
plained, it created a "contact-plus" analysis. See Ganis Corp. of Cal. v. Jackson,
822 F.2d 194, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting that under the "contract plus" analy-
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diction.'
In Asahi Metal,'16 Zurcher was injured as a result of his motorcycle
tire's sudden loss of air." 7 The tire tube was manufactured by Cheng
Shin in Taiwan. ' The tube's valve was made in Japan by Asahi, a
Japanese corporation, and shipped to Taiwan." 9 Zurcher sued Cheng
Shin and Cheng Shin cross-complained against Asahi.'2°
Cheng Shin sold tires throughout the world, but twenty percent of
its United States sales were in California.' It also bought valves
from other suppliers.2 2 Though there was no written contract avail-
able,' 23 Cheng Shin's sales to the United States were discussed with
Asahi. 24 Nonetheless, Asahi stated that it did not contemplate juris-
diction by California when it entered into the contract.'23
The United States Supreme Court ultimately held, in a plurality
sis, the court should examine communications before, during and after the con-
tract's consummation).
115. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 479-82 (noting the defendants rejected the
idea of a local enterprise; they had negotiated with a Florida franchiser; there were
manifold benefits of affiliation with a nationwide organization; they had planned a
twenty-year relationship; they had wide-reaching contacts with Florida; there were
foreseeable injuries to Burger King in Florida; the franchises' supervision was
from Florida, not from the Michigan branch office; and there was a Florida choice
of law provision in the contract).
116. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
117. See id. at 106 (noting the cause of Zurcher's injury).
118. See id. (noting Cheng Shin of Taiwan was named in the complaint as the
manufacturer of the tube).
119. See id. (explaining Asahi's role in the tire manufacturing process). This
sale to Cheng Shin represented 1.24% to 0.44% of Asahi's global income.
120. See id. (explaining that Cheng Shin sought indemnification from Asahi and
its co-defendants).
121. See id. (providing Cheng Shin's relevant corporate information).
122. See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 106 (noting Asahi was not Cheng Shin's sole
supplier).
123. See id. (noting the absence of a contract between Asahi and Cheng Shin).
124. See id. at 107 (quoting the affidavit of Cheng Shin's manager who stated
his belief that Asahi was aware that its value stem assemblies would be sold in
California).
125. See id. (quoting Asahi's president, who declared that due to its limited sales
to Cheng Shin, Asahi never contemplated being subject to lawsuits in California).
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opinion, that California did not have jurisdiction over Asahi.'2' Writ-
ing for the Court, but not for the majority,'2' Justice O'Connor stated
that Burger King reaffirmed that the "minimum contacts" analysis
requires "purposeful availment."'2' The consumer's unilateral be-
havior of bringing products into the state was insufficient.'' Justice
O'Connor stated that the Court rejected the idea that foreseeability
alone was enough.3 She then articulated her rule, which did not re-
ceive majority support, that merely placing a product in the stream of
commerce is not purposeful direction toward the forum state."' Ac-
cordingly, Justice O'Connor found that personal jurisdiction was
lacking.
132
126. See id. at 116 (holding that "minimum contacts" existed). The California
Superior Court held there was personal jurisdiction because of the international
scale of Asahi's business). The Court of Appeals reversed holding that it was un-
reasonable to base jurisdiction solely on foreseeability. See id. The California Su-
preme Court reversed, finding jurisdiction because Asahi benefited from sales in
California, intentionally placed its components in the stream of commerce and was
aware of Cheng Shin's California sales. See id. at 107 (providing a synopsis of the
lower courts' rulings).
127. See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 105 (summarizing which Justices agreed,
concurred and dissented from the judgment). Eight Justices agreed with Section 1,
essentially a recitation of the facts. See id. Only four Justices, however, agreed
with Section II.A, where Justice O'Connor explicated her "stream of commerce
plus" ideas while tentatively finding personal jurisdiction under the first tier
"minimum contacts" analysis. Id. Finally, in Section II.B, eight Justices agreed that
there was no personal jurisdiction under the fairness tier analysis. See id.
128. See id. at 109 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253) (holding that "'minimum
contacts" could only be established by a defendant's actions that result in the
privilege of conducting activity in the forum).
129. See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 109, citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 286 (emphasizing that the defendant's, and not the consumer's, acts estab-
lish "minimum contacts").
130. See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 106, citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 295-96 (noting that foreseeability alone was insufficient to establish juris-
diction under the Due Process Clause).
131. See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 112 (noting the similarity between this analy-
sis and what has been previously described as "contacts plus"). Additional factors
that Justice O'Connor would consider are: designing the product for the forum's
market; advertising in the forum state; establishing channels for advice to consum-
ers in the forum state; and marketing through a distributor who is state sales agent.
See id. (listing some other factors).
132. See id.
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Justice O'Connor then turned to the second tier of the test, the
"convenience" or "fairness" analysis. '33 The necessary factors to be
considered are the burden on the defendant, the forum state's inter-
ests, the plaintiffs interests, the interests of the interstate judicial
system, and the states' shared interests in social policies. 4 She stated
that the defendant's burden was severe here, particularly because de-
fending oneself in a foreign legal system is an additional burden."
Justice O'Connor then stated that both the plaintiffs interests and
California's interests were comparatively slight. 
13 6
The principles discussed in Asahi were extended to quasi in rem
jurisdiction in Shaffer v. Heitner,17 where the Court also looked at
whether the nonresident defendants "purposefully avail[ed them-
selves] of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state" ''
and "whether the nonresident defendants had reason to expect to be
hailed before a ... court" in the forum state.'39
C. THE "EFFECTS" TEST
Central to the argument that terrorist acts abroad subject the per-
petrators to personal jurisdiction in the United States is the so-called
"effects" test. This section discusses the origin of the test and its sub-
sequent, primarily restrictive, application.
1. Calder and Company
In Calder v. Jones,'40 actress Shirley Jones sued the National En-
133. See id. at 113 (writing for a unanimous court in this portion of her analy-
sis).
134. See Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 113 (citing the factors first stated in World-
Wide Volkswagen).
135. See id. at 114 (discussing one of the factors considered in the analysis).
136. See id. at 114-15 (noting that Zurcher, a California resident, had already
been compensated for his loss by Cheng Shin; the remaining issue was whether
Asahi Metal would be required to indemnify Cheng Shin for the payment).
137. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
138. See id. at 216 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
139. See id. (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
140. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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quirer for libel, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of
emotional distress over an article alleging that she drank too much to
fulfill her acting obligations. 4 ' Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a unanimous Court, held that California's long-arm stat-
ute14 2 enabled it to assert personal jurisdiction over a National En-
quirer reporter as well as the editor and president.'' Justice
Rehnquist's opinion upheld the California Court of Appeals' opinion
subjecting the defendants to personal jurisdiction, even though their
tortious acts originated in Florida and were aimed at a plaintiff in
California.'"
Justice Rehnquist appeared to adopt the California court's novel
"effects" theory of personal jurisdiction, but he not only failed to
support the theory, he discussed facts that were irrelevant if the the-
ory was the only basis for jurisdiction. :"5 First, Justice Rehnquist
stated that plaintiffs contacts "may be so manifold as to permit ju-
risdiction when it would not exist in their absence."'" Second, Justice
Rehnquist stated that because California is both the focal point of the
story and the place where the harm was suffered, personal jurisdic-
tion is proper "based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct in Cali-
141. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 785, 788 n.9 (discussing how Jones resided in Cali-
fornia and did most of her acting there).
142. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 786 n.5, citing CAL. Cir. PROC. CODE sec. 410.10
(West 1973) (affirming that California's long-arm statute allows personal jurisdic-
tion to the full extent allowed by the federal Constitution).
143. See id. at 785-86 (noting that the Enquirer itself, and its California dis-
tributor, were also named as defendants but did not contest personal jurisdiction).
144. See Calder, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1982) (establishing that the Superior Court
granted South and Calder's motions to quash service of process, even though per-
sonal jurisdiction existed, because it concluded that First Amendment concerns
outweighed the jurisdictional analysis). The California Court of Appeals rejected
the First Amendment analysis and reversed. See id. at 828 (discussing the court's
holding). See also Calder, 465 U.S. at 790 (holding that infusing First Amendment
issues would only serve to complicate an already imprecise analysis). The Supreme
Court agreed that First Amendment concerns had no place in personal jurisdiction
analysis. See id.
145. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 788-89.
146. See id. at 788 (citing McGee). In McGee, however, the defendant was
found to have "systematic and continuous" contacts with California and the suit
was based on a contract which had substantial connection to California. See supra
notes 43-50 and accompanying text (discussing McGee).
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fornia.' 4 7 More pointedly, the Court later stated, "[p]etitioners are
not charged with mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their inten-
tional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at Cali-
fornia."'
48
Despite the apparent justification for its holding, the Court spent a
significant portion of the opinion delineating the various defendants'
contacts with the forum that would have been considered in a more
traditional "minimum contacts" analysis, while denying the signifi-
cance of those contacts. 4 9 In the case, the reporter, South, had trav-
eled to California many times;' Calder, president and editor, had
147. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
292 and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 37. The
RESTATEMENT is hardly an unequivocal endorsement of the Court's holding. It
states:
Causing Effects in State by Act Done Elsewhere:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who
causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause
of action arising from those effects unless the nature of the effects and of the
individual's relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction
unreasonable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS sec. 37 (emphasis added).
The RESTATEMENT later makes it clear that this reasonableness is viewed "from
the standpoint of the international and interstate systems." Id. This would suggest
that the Restatement requires, at a minimum, consideration of the second tier of the
two-tiered Burger King test, which was adopted the year after Calder was decided
(although the "minimum contacts" test was firmly in place). But see Kulko, 436
U.S. at 96-97 (noting that the RESTATEMENT recognized that there might be cir-
cumstances where jurisdiction might be unreasonable despite an "effect" in state,
and that the section was inapplicable because "[t]here is no claim that appellant has
visited physical injury on either property or persons within the State of Califor-
nia").
148. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
149. See id. at 785 n.4 (discussing a refusal to delve into the disputed contention
that South had made one trip to California in connection with the Jones article be-
cause "we do not rely for out holding on the alleged visit"). Further, the Court did
not consider the California court's conclusion that the visit and phone calls to Cali-
fornia constituted an independent basis for jurisdiction for the same reason. See id.
at 787 n.6 (denying jurisdiction).
150. See id. at 785-86 n.3 (recounting how South had been to California more
than twenty times in the prior four years and had called sources in California for
the story and had also called Jones' husband in California).
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been to California twice,' I and the National Enquirer sold about
600,000 copies of each issue in California, almost twice as many as
were sold in the next highest sales volume state.'" The relevance of
these facts is unclear if traditional "minimum contacts" analysis was
no longer necessary where the intentional tort, wherever originated,
was aimed at a plaintiff in the forum jurisdiction.
In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, hIc.,'"' the companion case to Cal-
der, the Court held that the State of New Hampshire had personal ju-
risdiction over Hustler Magazine via its long-arm statute.' 1 The
Court reached this conclusion based on the fact that 10,000 to 15,000
copies of the magazine were sold in the state each month, despite the
fact that the plaintiff, a New York resident, had virtually no connec-
tion with the state. 5 5 In fact, she only selected New Hampshire as the
forum because, due to its unusually long six-year statute of limita-
tions for libel, it was the only state where she could file suit."" Inter-
estingly, the Court stated that, "[f]alse statements of fact harm both
the subject of the falsehood and the readers of the statement."'" Con-
sequently, despite the fact that the direct target of the injury, Keeton,
was not in New Hampshire, the collateral injury to New Hampshire
residents, caused by receiving false information about Keeton, was
apparently a "contact" to be weighed in the minimum contacts analy-
sis.158
In Nelson v. R. Greenspan & Co.,'59 the plaintiff claimed negligent
or intentional misrepresentation and breach of contract by the defen-
151. See id. at 786 (stating that once was for pleasure and the other was to testify
in a trial unrelated to the article).
152. See id. at 785 (providing sales information).
153. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
154. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774 n.4 (citing N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. sec. 300:14
(1977)) (noting the similarity to Calder where the state long-arm statute was held
to reach as far as the Due Process Clause).
155. See id. at 772 (discussing how the magazine she helped produce, which
listed her name in several places, was sold in New Hampshire).
156. See id. (explaining Keeton's reason for choosing New Hampshire).
157. Id. at 776.
158. See id. (explaining the Court's reasoning in reaching its judgment).
159. 613 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Mo 1985).
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dant, a New York corporation.'6° In finding personal jurisdiction, the
court noted that the offer was apparently accepted in Missouri, 6' that
the defendants knew their actions would harm the plaintiff in Mis-
souri and that their conduct was "directed at" the plaintiff in Mis-
•162
souri.16
In Hugel v. McNell,163 the First Circuit followed Calder and found
that New Hampshire's long-arm statute properly gained personal ju-
risdiction over the McNells, when false information they provided to
The Washington Post injured Hugel in New Hampshire. 64 The court
found direct injuries to the plaintiff in New Hampshire.'65 Further, the
court found that the defendants "intended the brunt of the injury to be
felt in New Hampshire."' 6 6 The court interpreted Calder as requiring
a contacts analysis: "[t]he knowledge that the major impact of the
injury would be felt in the forum State constitutes a purposeful con-
tact or substantial connection whereby the intentional tortfeasor
could reasonably expect to be haled into the forum State's courts to
160. See Nelson, 613 F. Supp. at 344 (recalling how the defendants allegedly
asked the plaintiff to move from Missouri to New York to take a job).
16 1. See id. (recounting the facts of the case).
162. See id. at 346 (demonstrating knowledge of the consequences of the defen-
dant's actions).
163. 886 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1989).
164. See Hugel, 886 F.2d at 2-3 (discussing the facts of the case). Sam McNeil
and Max Hugel entered into a business relationship and Hugel loaned Sam
$377,000. The business and the personal relationship turned sour and the loan was
never repaid. Sam's brother Tom then told The Washington Post that Hugel was
involved in illegal securities transactions. The allegations were false and Tom
knew them to be false. Publication of the article forced Hugel to resign as Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. On the day the story was released the
McNells disappeared. Hugel filed in New Hampshire for libel and slander. With
the McNells still in hiding, the court entered a default judgment against them. Af-
ter their capture in California (and conviction on criminal fraud and conspiracy
charges) the McNells moved for relief of the default judgment under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure sec. 60(b)(6). The district court denied the motion and the
McNell's appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the court lacked personal jurisdiction
over them. See Hugel, 886 F.2d at 2-3.
165. See id. at 3 (finding that "McNells' defamation of Hugel resulted in injury
to his business reputation in New Hampshire.").
166. Id. at 4.
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defend his actions. ' '67 For reasons not explained, the court did not
engage in a fairness tier analysis.6'
In Sinatra v. National Enquirer hzc.,'6 the court had the opportu-
nity to consider the interaction of the Calder "effects" test and the
"reasonableness" component of Asahi. "' The case arose when em-
ployees of a Swiss clinic, in the hopes of attracting American clients,
falsely told a Florida-based reporter for a nationally circulated publi-
cation that entertainer and California resident Frank Sinatra had un-
dergone age-reversing treatments at their clinic."' The court stated
that the Ninth Circuit had interpreted the cases of Burger King and
Calder together to modify the "purposeful availment" standard "to
allow 'the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant whose only
'contact' with the forum is the 'purposeful direction' of a foreign act
having effect in the forum state.'"'" The court found a substantial
number of activities aimed at California.'"7 In addition, the court
found that the clinic should have reasonably anticipated being haled
into court in California. 7 Finally, the court found jurisdiction to be
reasonable under a "reasonableness" inquiry.'"
167. Id. (citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90).
168. See Hugel, 886 F.2d at (deciding to forego the fairness analysis).
169. 854 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. 1987).
170. See Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1192 (considering whether statements by a Swiss
clinic were sufficient "minimum contacts" to establish personal jurisdiction).
171. See id. at 1192-93 (noting that Sinatra first filed suit in California Superior
Court, but the suit was removed to federal court based on diversity of citizenship).
172. Id. at 1195 (citing Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund Ltd.,
784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986)).
173. See id. at 1195-96 (reporting that the clinic used Californian Sinatra's
name; the clinic advertised in California; the situs of Sinatra's reputational injury
was California; the clinic treated many California residents and a substantial per-
centage of the clinic's United States patients were from California).
174. See id. at 1197 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297) (consid-
ering that the clinic had a relative amount of commercial activity in the forum
state).
175. See Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1201 (finding that the clinic was unable to rebut
the presumption of reasonableness established by its commercial activity).
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2. Questioning and Narrowly Construing Calder
A number of courts have subsequently questioned the teachings of
Calder or have interpreted it narrowly. 76 In Denmark v. Tzimas,'" the
court dismissed malicious prosecution, libel, and slander charges
against a British citizen for lack of personal jurisdiction.' The court
described the appropriate test as "remarkably straightforward":
whether the foreign defendant had "minimum contacts with the state
resulting from affirmative or purposeful conduct of the defendant,"
and whether it was "unfair or unreasonable" to require the defendant
to defend in the forum. 179 The court noted that the plaintiff had
evoked the Calder "effects" doctrine in arguing personal jurisdiction
for the libel and slander claims," but concluded that "plaintiffs' reli-
ance on those cases is misplaced."' 8 The court stated that, "[t]he tort
of libel... [is a] unique tort which courts have.., held to have oc-
curred simultaneously in the locales of transmission and receipt."'' 2
176. See infra notes 177-215 and accompanying text (discussing the cases).
177. 871 F. Supp. 261, 264 (E.D. La. 1994). The case arose when criminal
charges were filed against Gillian Denmark, a United States citizen, in England for
the theft and handling of stolen goods belonging to Aris Tzimas, a British citizen.
See id. In 1993, Ms. Denmark was acquitted of the criminal charges. However,
when the instant case was decided, an English civil case by Tzimas against Den-
mark was still pending. See id. In 1994, Ms. Denmark filed suit in federal court in
Louisiana against Tzimas for malicious prosecution, and for libel and slander. See
id. The later complaints were based on the fact that Tzimas had allegedly caused
an article about Ms. Denmark's arrest to be published in a British magazine and
because Tzimas had allegedly told Ms. Denmark's customers, potential customers
and fellow dealers that Ms. Denmark was a thief. See id.
178. See Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 265 (dismissing the claim for lack of personal ju-
risdiction and forum non conveniens).
179. See id. (providing the two-step analysis for determining jurisdiction).
180. See id. at 267 (citing Calder, supra text accompanying notes 140-52, Sina-
tra, supra text accompanying notes 169-175, and Coreil as cases applying the "ef-
fects" doctrine). The court dismissed the malicious prosecution with minimal dis-
cussion because all of the events occurred in England. See id. (providing the
court's explanation for dismissal).
181. See id. at 267 (noting that both Calder and Coreil involved defendants who
regularly published and distributed their work in the forum states, and that in Si-
natra the defendant intended to actively solicit United States clients through the
publication of the article about Sinatra).
182. Id. at 268, citing Paul v. International Precious Metals Corp., 613 F. Supp.
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The court held that "minimum contacts" were established because
the defendant had called the plaintiff in Louisiana and had published
allegedly defamatory remarks about her in Louisiana." ' Nonetheless,
the court found that the "fairness" tier required dismissal of the
claims, particularly since the burden on the defendant would be sig-
nificant if forced to litigate in Louisiana. '
In Laykin v. McFall,'" a Texas case involving a complaint of con-
version, fraud, and deceptive business practices,'" the court stated
that: "[t]o hold that the requisite minimum contacts are automatically
established when an intentional tortfeasor knowingly causes injury in
the forum state would practically reduce due process to a mechanical
test which fails to examine the quality and nature of the nonresi-
dent's actions.' 8 7 Warning that Calder "should not be interpreted
beyond the facts of the case," '' the court reasoned that a holding that
"minimum contacts" are always established when an intentional tort-
feasor knowingly causes injury in the state would be "too broad an
interpretation of Calder."'
Writing in dissent, Justice Poff gave a broad interpretation to Cal-
der, noting correctly that the Court had "explicitly stated that its
174, 176 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (citing Keeton, supra text accompanying notes 154-
158).
183. See Denmark, 871 F. Supp. at 269 (following precedent cases, which liber-
ally construe Louisiana's long-arm statute).
184. See id. at 268 (finding that the burden on the defendant to litigate in the
United States would be significant, especially since all of his witnesses were in
England).
185. 830 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
186. See Laykin, 830 S.W.2d at 268 (discussing the facts of the case) In Laykin,
Livermore, a Texas resident, contacted California resident Laykin by telephone
and asked her to sell a ring for her. See id. The parties agreed and the ring was sent
to California. However, before Laykin could sell the ring Livermore found a buyer
in Texas. See id. Livermore demanded the return of the ring and Laykin refused.
Livermore sued Laykin in Texas, and Laykin filed a special appearance contesting
the Texas court's personal jurisdiction over him. See id. The trial judge, McFall,
overruled the special appearance, and Laykin sought a writ of mandamus against
McFall. See id.
187. Id. at 271 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 468).
188. See Laykin, 830 S.W.2d at 270 n.3.
189. Id. at271.
2000] 19
420 AM. U. INT'L L. REV [15:395
holding did not depend on the alleged fact that [one of the defen-
dants] visited California in connection with the article."'
In Wallace v. Herron, 9' a case involving malicious prosecution,19'2
the court dismissed the suit, despite the plaintiffs' reliance on Cal-
der.'93 The court stated: "[w]e do not believe that the Supreme Court,
190. Id. at 276 (Poff, J., dissenting). Justice Poff cited cases broadly interpreting
Calder. See Hugel v. McNell, 886 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989) (establishing the tort-
feasor's knowledge that the injury would be felt in the forum state constitutes a
purposeful act in that state); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Neaves, 912 F.2d 1062,
1065 (9th Cir, 1990) (allowing jurisdiction over a defendant whose only contact
with the state is purposefully directing an act with an effect in that state); South-
mark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that when
a defendant purposefully directs an act toward a state and knows that the acts ef-
fects will be felt in that state, the defendant can anticipate being brought to court
there); Davilla-Fermin v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 738 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1990)
(involving incorrect credit card records); Coblentz GMC/Freightliner, Inc. v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 1364 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (involving termination of a
truck dealership for manufacturer's trucks); Nelson v. R. Greenspan & Co., 613 F.
Supp. 342 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (alleging that the corporation falsely induced plaintiff
to move to New York for employment); see also W. Frank Newton & Jeremy C.
Wicker, Personal Jurisdiction and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in
Texas, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 491, 535-36 (1986) (asserting that a forum state has
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who intentionally inflicts injury on one of its
residents).
191. 778 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1985).
192. See Wallace, 778 F.2d at 393, 393 n.1, 396 (recounting the lower courts
holdings). Indiana residents Donna and Willis Seeley, wanted to start a log home
franchise so they consulted with the plaintiff, Rod Wallace, also an Indiana resi-
dent and independent contractor in the field, but did not contract with him. Instead,
they contracted with Real Log Homes, Inc. ("Real"). See id. at 392. The Seeleys
moved their territory to California, and when the relationship with Real turned
sour, they hired the defendants, several lawyers including named defendant Wayne
Herron, to sue Real in California state court. See id. Even though Wallace was not
related to Real and had not participated in the negotiations to obtain the franchise,
Herron added Wallace as a defendant to the California suit. See id. The Seeleys
later dismissed the case against Wallace and Wallace then sued Herron in Indiana
state court for malicious prosecution. See id. Wallace also sued the Seeleys but this
case was dismissed by mutual stipulation and played no part in the federal suit. See
id. at 392. The state court held that it had personal jurisdiction over Herron. See id.
Herron removed the case to the federal district court and then moved for dismissal
on the grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. See
id. The district court agreed and dismissed the case and the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed. See id.
193. See Wallace, 778 F.2d. at 395 (stating that, "[t]he Supreme Court did not
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in Calder, was saying that any plaintiff may hale a defendant into
court, in the plaintiffs home state, where the defendant has no con-
tacts, merely by asserting that the defendant has committed an inten-
tional tort against the plaintiff."' The court noted that Burger King
was decided after Calder and that under Burger King the purposeful
establishment of "minimum contacts" and "foreseeability" remained
the constitutional touchstones of the personal jurisdiction analysis.'"
Further, the court noted that the Calder defendants had significant
"minimum contacts" with the forum state under the traditional test.'"
In Casualty Assurance Risk hIs. Brokerage v. Dillon, " the Ninth
Circuit narrowly interpreted Calder and Keeton to stand for the
proposition that the circulation of allegedly libelous material in the
forum was "an important factor in the minimum contacts analysis for
a defamation action."'98 Thus, the court found that Calder and Keeton
had not modified the traditional test for personal jurisdiction.'
intend the Calder "effects" test to apply only to libel cases.").
194. Id. at 394.
195. See id. at 395 (declaring that the Supreme Court in Burger King and World-
Wide Volksvagen found "minimum contacts" and "foreseeability" to be the deter-
mining factors for personal jurisdiction).
196. See id. (noting that in Calder the defendants used California sources to
write an article about the activities of a California resident in that state).
197. 976 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1992). The Casualty Assurance Risk Insurance
Brokerage ("CARIB"), which was incorporated under the laws of Guam, attempted
to qualify to sell medical malpractice insurance in Indiana through a closely related
entity, Medical Liability Purchasing Group ("MLPG"). See id. Dillon, Indiana's
Attorney General, denied the application because neither CARIB nor MLPG was
licensed in Indiana. Shortly thereafter Guam revoked CARIB's Certificate of
Authority. See id. Dillon sent a letter to all healthcare providers that had been so-
licited by MLPG informing them of these events. See id. CARIB alleged that the
letter was intentionally drafted to be misleading and to harm CARIB, so CARIB
sued, inter alia, for libel. CARIB sued Dillon in Guam on the Calder theory that
the foreseeable effect of the letter was to harm a Guam entity. See id. The Superior
Court of Guam dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and the United States
District Court for the District of Guam affirmed. See id.
198. Dillon, 976 F.2d at 599.
199. See id. at 600 (outlining the traditional three-prong analysis: whether the
defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in
the forum state; whether the claim arose from defendant's forum-related activities;
and whether exercise ofjurisdiction would be reasonable).
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In Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Federation,2 o in the
aftermath of a convoluted fact pattern of arbitration and litigation,'"
the Sixth Circuit was faced with a Calder-style "effect" when the
International Amateur Athletic Federation's ("IAAF") allegedly tor-
tiously issued a press release from London in Ohio. 02 After applying
Ohio's long-arm statute,03 the court distinguished Calder because
therein the "intentional actions were aimed at California and the
brunt of the harm was felt in there."2° Consequently, the court found
205no personal jurisdiction.
In Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, the court had the opportunity
to consider the Calder "effects" test in the context of the intentional
torts of breach of contract, intentional interference with a contractual
relationship, economic duress and bad faith. 0 7 Although first stating
200. 23 F.3d 110 (6th Cir. 1994).
201. See Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1112-13 (detailing the history of the arbitration
and legal actions involved in the case). World class sprinter Butch Reynolds tested
positive for steroids after a race in Monte Carlo, Monaco. See id. The drug was
banned by regulations promulgated by the International Amateur Athletic Federa-
tion ("IAAF"), an unincorporated, London-based association of more than two
hundred countries' national athletic associations, including The Athletic Confer-
ence ("TAC") of the United States. See id. Reynolds was banned from interna-
tional competitions for two years by the IAAF and it issued a press release to that
effect. The press release was picked up and printed by United States media, in-
cluding media in Johnson's native Ohio. See id. Johnson was later completely ex-
onerated by TAC, based on questions as to the validity of the drug tests. See id.
The IAAF reversed and upheld the suspensions. See id. After administrative reme-
dies were exhausted, and following extensive maneuverings among the IAAC,
TAC and Johnson, Johnson filed suit in the Southern District of Ohio, alleging,
inter alia, defamation, based upon the press release. See id.
202. See Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1119 (finding that Reynolds' argument that the
press release was aimed at him in Ohio was distinguishable from Calder).
203. See id. (citing O.R.C. sec. 2307.328(A)(6) which provides for personal ju-
risdiction for anyone, "causing tortious injury in this state.., by an act outside this
state").
204. See id. at 1120. The IAAF had argued that a suit in Ohio "would offend
principles of international comity and put international cooperation at risk," and
further, that defending the suit would be "inconvenient." See id. at 1117.
205. See id. at 1114 (concluding that the district court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over the IAAF).
206. 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995).
207. See Far West Capital, 46 F.3d at 1073-74. Defendant Towne, a Nevada
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that Far West Capital's ("FWC") "strongest arguments" derived from
Calder,20' the court concluded that the courts applying Calder to in-
tentional business torts, "[h]ave not created a per se rule that an alle-
gation of an intentional tort creates personal jurisdiction. Instead,
courts have emphasized that the defendant has additional contacts
with the forum."2 9 The Court then proceeded to apply Burger King,
and found that the necessary minimum contacts with Utah were
lacking. 1°
Finally, in Allred v. Moore & Peterson," the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the effects on a Mississippi lawyer, in Mississippi, of an alleg-
resident, owned Nevada real property rich in geothermal resources. See id. Defen-
dant Fleetwood was an Oregon corporation associated with Towne. See id. Plain-
tiff Far West Capital, Inc. ("FWC") and Towne engaged in lengthy negotiations
before finally entering into geothermal and mineral leases. See id. The leases had
choice of law provisions selecting Nevada law. See id. When FWC began negoti-
ating with General Electric to obtain financing for two geothermal power plants,
Towne and Fleetwood made additional monetary demands for consents that, FWC
claimed, should have been freely given. See id. FWC brought suit in Utah's Fed-
eral District Court in a diversity action claiming breach of contract, intentional in-
terference with a contractual relationship, economic duress and bad faith. See id.
The lower court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. See id.
208. See id. at 1077 (suggesting that FWC's strongest argument is that the de-
fendants are subject to personal jurisdiction because they committed torts against
FWC in Utah).
209. See Far West Capital, 46 F.3d at 1078, see also Goblentz
GMC/Freightliner, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 1364 (M.D. Ala.
1989) (finding Volvo amenable to suit in Alabama for intentional torts involving
termination of a dealership where Volvo had established a litigation fund to defend
such suits and could anticipate being haled into Alabama court); Borshow Hosp. &
Medical Supplies, Inc. v. Burdick-Siemens Corp., 143 F.R.D. 472, 485 (D.P.R.
1992) (finding that the defendant mailed letters to and traveled to the jurisdiction);
But see Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors Inc., 851 F.2d 763, 772-73 (5th Cir.
1988) (finding no jurisdiction in Texas based on a contract negotiated in Atlanta or
New York, the alleged breach of which had effects on a Texas corporation);
Wallace, 778 F.2d at 395 (holding that jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home forum is
not created under Calder by the mere allegation of an intentional tort).
210. See Far West Capital, 46 F.3d at 1079-80 (applying the Burger King stan-
dard of examining "prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences,
along with the terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing" and
any other contracts resulting from the out-of-state defendant committing the al-
leged tort).
211. 117 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 691 (1998).
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edly frivolous third-party lawsuit brought by Texas and Louisiana
212attorneys. Personal jurisdiction was gained under Mississippi's
long-arm statute, which supports the traditional choice of law idea
that a tort is completed where the last act necessary to make it a tort
(the injury) occurs.1 3 Considering Calder, the court stated, "[t]he ef-
fects test is not a substitute for a nonresident's minimum contacts,
which demonstrate purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum
state."2 ' The court concluded that insufficient contacts existed to es-. .. . . 211
tablish jurisdiction.
D. GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Although general personal jurisdiction can be said to have its
genesis in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,"' the case univer-
sally cited is Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,2 '
which arose as a result of a helicopter crash in Peru in which four
United States citizens died.2"' Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia
("Helicopteros") was a Colombian corporation and the decedents
212. See Allred, 117 F.3d 280 (describing the nature of the case and source of
controversy between the parties). Plaintiff Allred was a lawyer for the Louisiana
Insurance Commissioner in a lawsuit against Rush in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. See id. During the suit Rush's lawyers
instituted a third-party suit against Allred. See id. Allred filed suit in state court;
the defendants removed the case to federal court and then moved for dismissal for
lack of personal jurisdiction. See id.
213. See id. at 282 (interpreting MISS. CODE ANN. sec. 13-3-57 (1996 Supp.)).
214. Id. at 286 (citing Wallace, supra notes 190-95).
215. See id. at 287 (holding that the District Court properly decided that it
lacked personal jurisdiction under Mississippi's long-arm statute).
216. Perkins, 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In Perkins a state court had exercised per-
sonal jurisdiction, pursuant to Ohio's long-arm statute, over a Philippine mining
corporation that maintained an active office in Ohio, held directors' meetings in
Ohio, kept files in Ohio, distributed salary checks from Ohio banks and otherwise
carried on systematic and continuous activities within Ohio. See id. Thus, even
though the cause of action was unrelated to these activities, the Court held that
there was general personal jurisdiction. See id. at 438, 447-48 (listing the contacts
between the defendant and the state of Ohio that the state court found to grant it
jurisdiction over the defendant).
217. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
218. 466 U.S. at 410 (describing the respondents as the survivors of four Ameri-
cans who died in a helicopter crash).
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were employed by Consorcio, an international Peruvian joint venture
headquartered in Texas.2 9 Helicopteros performed under a contract
signed in Peru, written in Spanish, and conveying Peruvian jurisdic-
tion on controversies arising out of the contract.2, In addition, Heli-
copteros had a number of contacts with Texas.2"
Confronted with the issue of whether it was consistent with due
process to allow Texas to assert jurisdiction over Helicopteros," the
Supreme Court began by first discussing the conventional minimum
contacts analysis,m and suggested that personal jurisdiction may,
nonetheless, exist if there are "sufficient contacts."2" The Court,
however, concluded that there were not sufficient contacts for gen-
eral jurisdiction. 22
In Metropolitan Life his. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp.,-, the Sec-
ond Circuit found that there were sufficient contacts for general ju-
219. See id. (identifying Consorcio as the alter ego of a Houston-based, joint
venture named Williams-Sedco-Horn).
220. See id. at 410-11 (describing the contract under which Helicopteros per-
formed).
221. See id. (listing those contacts as: Helicopteros' purchase of approximately
80 percent of its helicopter fleet, valued at S4 million, from Bell Helicopter in
Texas; the training of its pilots in Texas; and the deposit of more than S5 million in
payments into its bank accounts through a Texas bank).
222. A wrongful death action was filed in a Texas trial court. Helicopteros made
a special appearance to deny jurisdiction. The trial court denied Helicopteros' mo-
tion. The appellate court reversed, holding that there was no personal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed, finding there was personal jurisdiction. See
id. at 412-13.
223. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (finding that Izternational Shoe allows
for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident, corporate defendant,
in accordance with the due process requirement when "certain minimum contacts"
exist between the defendant and the forum state).
224. See id. (concluding that even when the cause of action does not arise from
or relate to contacts between the defendant foreign corporation and the forum state,
due process still allows a state to assert personal jurisdiction if"sufficient contacts"
exist).
225. See id. at 416 (holding that Helicopteros' contacts with Texas were not the
continuous and systematic business contacts required for general jurisdiction under
Perkins).
226. 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996).
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risdiction but that the fairness test was not met.227 In so doing, the
court assumed what the Supreme Court never made explicit: that the
"fairness" tier of the two-tiered Asahi test applies in general jurisdic-
tion cases.228
II. THE FSIA AND FLIGHT 103
This section discusses the concept of sovereign immunity, the
original commercial exception to sovereign immunity contained in
the FSIA, the judicial determination that the FSIA did not give
American courts jurisdiction over Libya in the original civil suit
against Libya for the bombing of Flight 103, and the legislative re-
sponse of the "state sponsors of terrorism" exception to the amended
FSIA.
A. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The concept of sovereign immunity is covered extensively else-
where 229 and will be reviewed only briefly here. The classic or abso-
lute theory holds that states are equal sovereigns and one state cannot
exercise jurisdiction over another state or its agents in domestic
courts.20 The theory was made the law of the land in the United
227. In order to benefit from Vermont's long statute of limitations, the Metro-
politan Life Insurance Company ("Met Life") filed suit against the Robertson-Ceco
Company ("Robertson") for breach of contract and negligence in the design, manu-
facture and installation of glass and metal walls of a Met Life office building in
Florida. Although the instant suit had nothing to do with Vermont, Met Life argued
that personal jurisdiction was proper in Vermont because Robertson's general
business contacts with Vermont were sufficiently "continuous and systematic" to
subject it to general personal jurisdiction. See id. at 564-65, citing Helicopteros,
466 U.S. at 414-16 n.9 (recounting the nature of the controversy).
228. See id. at 573 (implying that the "fairness" tier of the two-tiered Asahi test
applies to general and specific personal jurisdiction cases). The court stated that
every circuit that had considered the issue had agreed that the fairness tier applied
to general jurisdiction cases. See id., citing Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navi-
gation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993).
229. See, e.g., M. Scott Bucci, Breaking Through the Immunity Wall? Implica-
tions of the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 3 J.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 293 (1997).
230. See id., citing Louis Henken et al., INT'L LAW CASES & MATERIALS 891
(2d ed. 1987) (explaining sovereign immunity).
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States by Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don."' The weakness of the absolute theory was exposed in Berizzi
Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro232 and was exacerbated by the fact that
states were engaging in an increased amount of commercial activity.
As the Supreme Court shifted away from absolute immunity by de-
ferring to the executive branch,' the "Tate Letter" affinned that the
State Department would thereafter apply a restrictive form of sover-
eign immunity which would be recognized "with regard to sovereign
or public acts (juri inperii) of state, but not with respect to private
acts (juri gestionis)."' There followed a period of confusion over the
placement of the line between juri impeii and juri gestionis."3
B. THE COMMERCIAL EXCEPTION AND THE ORIGINAL FSIA
Congress enacted the FSIA to codify and clarify the restrictive
theory and to shift the burden of deciding whether or not it applied
from the executive to the judicial branch. ' The FSIA provided six2
exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) international agreements to
which the United States was a party as of October 21, 1976; 2"' (2)
explicit or implicit waiver;29 (3) commercial activities; :  (4) rights in
231. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) I16(1812).
232. 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (upholding sovereign immunity in the case of a ship
owned by Italy, even though it was a merchant, not a ship of war).
233. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (deferring to the Ex-
ecutive Branch on questions of sovereign immunity); see also Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30 (1945) (reaffirming the holding in Erparte Republic qfPen).
234. See Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to
Foreign Governments, May 19, 1952, 26 Dep't State Bull., at 984 (explaining that
the letter was authored by the legal advisor to the State Department, Jack Tate).
235. See Bucci, supra note 229, at 299-301 (discussing the subsequent confu-
sion).
236. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28
U.S.C. secs. 1330; 1332(a)(2)-(4); 1391(f); 1441(d); and 1602-1611).
237. See 28 U.S.C. secs. 1604-1605 (listing the six exceptions that grant sover-
eign immunity).
238. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1604.
239. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(1).
240. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(2).
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property taken in violation of international law;2 4 ' (5) injuries to per-
son or property caused by certain tortious activities "occurring in the
United States" 24 2; and (6) enforcement of arbitration agreements en-
tered into by the parties capable of settlement within the United
States.243
Of particular interest to the instant analysis is the commercial ac-
tivity exception, because its "direct effects" clause 44 is relevant to the
argument presented in Rein, i.e. that Libya's alleged bombing in
Scotland had a direct effect in the United States.2 4' The "direct ef-
fects" clause was carefully explored in Texas Trading & Milling
Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria2 46 and, although its languagewa*icntue*yte .•247 2548
was misconstrued by the plaintiffs, the government, and the Dis-
trict Court249 in Rein, the Texas Trading supports the argument that
the FSIA cannot confer personal jurisdiction over a sovereign with-
out meeting the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
241. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(3) (listing issues of property rights as an excep-
tion to sovereign immunity).
242. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(4).
243. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(5).
244. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(2). The commercial activity exception states that a
foreign sovereign will not be immune from suit in a case where:
[t]he action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States.
28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added).
245. See Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 530 (summarizing the arguments in the case).
246. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). The case
arose "out of one of the most enormous commercial disputes in history, and pres-
ent[ed] questions which strike to the very heart of the modem international order."
Id.
247. See Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 20, at 35 (citing Texas Trading to deter-
mine personal jurisdiction).
248. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 17-18 (citing Texas Trad-
ing to determine personal jurisdiction).
249. See Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 330 (using Texas Trading to determine personal
jurisdiction).
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Amendment to the United States Constitution, even where an act
outside the United States has a direct effect in the United States.:1'
The Texas Trading litigation -' arose when Nigeria and its Central
Bank unilaterally altered letters of credit and anticipatorily breached
some 109 contracts with 68 suppliers who had contracted to supply
Nigeria with sixteen million metric tons of cement at a purchase
price of almost one billion dollars."- In the four New York lawsuits
Nigeria did not "seriously dispute" that its actions constituted antici-
patory breaches of contract but rather argued that there was no juris-
diction under the FSIA.2
3
250. See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308 (requiring the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause to be met before personal jurisdiction can be established).
251. The case captioned Texas Trading was the consolidated appeal of four
cases heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. The four corporations, all trading companies incorporated in New York,
were Texas Trading, Decor by Nikkei International, Inc., East Europe Import-
Export, Inc. and Chenax Majesty, Inc. See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 303 (pro-
viding a history of the suit). Forty potential claimants settled. See id. at 306, citing
National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 597 F.2d 314, 316 (2d Cir.
1979) (discussing the disposition of part of the suit). Others filed suit in, inter alia,
the United Kingdom or Germany, or pursued arbitration through the International
Chamber of Commerce. See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 306 n. 15 (discussing the
disposition of part of the suit).
252. The cement was to be shipped from primarily Spanish ports to La-
gos/Apapa, Nigeria. To finance the deals, Nigeria established irrevocable letters of
credit with the Central Bank of Nigeria ("Central Bank"), a government entity. The
advising bank was the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company ("Morgan") of New
York. Nigeria had apparently expected something less than full and prompt deliv-
ery of the cement, because the port of Lagos/Apapa could handle between one and
five million tons of cement a year and full compliance with the contracts would
have required the port to handle sixteen million tons in eighteen months. When
ships began piling up, unable to unload at the dock, Central Bank instructed
Morgan not to pay under the letters of credit unless the supplier submitted an addi-
tional document proving that the ship had obtained permission to dock two months
before its arrival at Nigeria. "Nigeria's unilateral alteration of the letters of credit
took place on a scale previously unknown to international commerce." Nigeria
took these actions despite Morgan's warning to Central Bank that, "We believe
that there is an increasing possibility that litigation against you may be instituted in
New York." See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 304, 305 (recounting the facts of the
case).
253. See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 306 (noting that jurisdiction rather than
breach of contract was at issue).
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The First Circuit first observed that the FSIA purported to provide
answers to three questions: the availability of the defense of sover-
eign immunity; the presence of subject matter jurisdiction; and the
propriety of personal jurisdiction. The court then stated that "the
FSIA seems at first glance to make the answer to one of the ques-
tions, subject matter jurisdiction, dispositive of all three."2'" The
court, however, concluded that "Congress has only an incomplete
power to tie personal jurisdiction to subject matter jurisdiction; its
prerogatives are constrained by the due process clause." ' 6 The court
then turned directly to the "direct effect" clause, finding that there
was subject matter jurisdiction in this case.2" As for personal juris-
diction, the court stated:
The Act, therefore, makes the statutory aspect of personal jurisdiction
simple: subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal
jurisdiction .2 8 But, the Act cannot create personal jurisdiction where the
Constitution forbids it. Accordingly, each finding of personal jurisdiction
under the FSIA requires, in addition, a due process scrutiny of the court's
254. See id. (listing the questions the FSIA purported to answer). 28 U.S.C. sec.
1330 states:
Section. 1330 Actions against foreign states
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under
sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agree-
ment.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim jbr
relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a)
where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.
For purposes of subsection (b) an appearance by a foreign state does not con-
fer personal jurisdiction with respect to any claim for relief not arising out of
any transaction or occurrence enumerated in sections 1605-1607 of this title.
28 U.S.C. sec. 1330 (1994) (emphasis added).
255. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 306 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 307.
257. See id. at 310-11 (finding statutory subject matter jurisdiction based on 28
U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(2)).
258. See House Report, at 6622.
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power to exercise its authority over a particular defendant.i
Thus, it seemed clear to the court that, while the FS1A can strip
away sovereign immunity from a foreign state defendant and at the
same time grant subject matter jurisdiction to a federal court, it can-
not trump the Due Process Clause and grant that court personal juris-
diction where the traditional requirements imposed by International
Shoe are not met.W Personal jurisdiction, therefore, under the FSIA
cannot extend beyond the bounds established by the Due Process
Clause, Le. minimum contacts, as that term has been construed by
the Supreme Court, unless and until the Court holds otherwise.!' Of
necessity then, the court performed the "minimum contacts" analysis,
first finding that Nigeria, through the Central Bank and its relation-
ship with Morgan, purposefully availed itself of the privileges of
American law and could have expected to be haled into an American
forum, and, thus, the court concluded that such contacts existed.
: 2
With some exceptions," 3 most courts have agreed that where sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is predicated upon section 1605(a)(2) of the
FSIA, personal jurisdiction must be determined by reference to In-
264ternational Shoe and its progeny.
259. Id. at 308.
260. See id. at 314 (identifying the minimum contacts requirement).
261. See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 310-11 (emphasizing the importance of
constitutional limitations).
262. See id. at 314-15 (outlining the ways by which Nigeria summoned the pro-
tections and benefits of American laws).
263. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that the FSIA is the exclusive source of subject matter jurisdiction in suits
including foreign states and using a "substantial contacts" standard rather than a
"minimum contacts" standard); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.
1985) (failing to conduct a constitutional analysis based on International Shoe);
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534 (11 th Cir. 1993), cert. deniedI,
508 U.S. 907 (1993) (embracing the "stream of commerce" standard for "mini-
mum contacts").
264. See Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 753 F. Supp. 1201 (S.D.N.Y.),
affd, 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), ajfd. 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (holding that the de-
fendants were subject to jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception of
FSIA and that creditors did have sufficient contacts with the United States to war-
rant personal jurisdiction over the defendants); Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892
F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing hIternational Shoe and denying personal juris-
diction over claims against state-owned corporations); Gregorian v. Izvestia, 871
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A bomb, which apparently had been placed on the airplane in
Germany or England, exploded while Pan Am Flight 103 was over
Lockerbie, Scotland, en route from Frankfurt, Germany to Detroit,M. .. 265
Michigan. It is assumed that the bomb was timed to explode while
the plane was over the Atlantic Ocean, but because of a delay in the
F.2d 1515 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 891 (1989) (using International Shoe's
"minimum contacts" standard after holding the libel action against a Soviet news-
paper did not fall within the commercial activity exception of the FSIA); Gemini
Shipping, Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for Chems. & Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317 (2d
Cir. 1981) (invoking International Shoe's "minimum contacts" standard and find-
ing jurisdiction over defendant corporation); Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo
Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing In-
ternational Shoe as the prevailing personal jurisdiction case); Carey v. National Oil
Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that the FSIA embodies International
Shoe's "minimum contacts" standard); Ampac Group, Inc. v. Republic of Hondu-
ras, 797 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1992), affd, 40 F.3d 389 (11 th Cir. 1994) (finding
personal jurisdiction over Honduras); Walpex Trading Co. v. Yacimientos Petro-
liferos Fiscales Bolivianos, 712 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (relying on Interna-
tional Shoe and its progeny); Maritime Ventures Int'l, Inc. v. Caribbean Trading &
Fidelity, Ltd., 689 F. Supp. 1340, reconsideration denied, 722 F. Supp. (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding that the FSIA incorporates due process notions of "minimum con-
tacts"); Falcoal, Inc. v. Turkiye Komur Isletmeleri Kurumu, 660 F. Supp. 1536
(S.D. Tex. 1987) (invoking International Shoe); Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Ja-
maica, 643 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding that litigation in the United
States would not be unduly inconvenient to the bank, and that the bank should
have foreseen that its actions would result in litigation in the United States);
Unidyne Corp. v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 640 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Va. 1985)
(adopting International Shoe's "minimum contacts" standard and holding no such
contacts were established by the airline); Crimson Semiconductor, Inc. v. Electro-
num, 629 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (ruling that the breach of contact had a
"direct effect" in the United States and gave the District Court subject matter juris-
diction and that that seller's contract with the United States satisfied the constitu-
tional requirements of due process); Continental Graphic Div. of Republic Corp. v.
Hiller, 614 F. Supp. 1125 (D.C. Utah 1985) (holding that the court had personal
jurisdiction over the agency); Decor by Nikkei Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
497 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981); cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1148 (1982) (using International Shoe and finding personal jurisdiction
over the defendants); East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F.
Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that the
District Court did not have personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations under
FSIA); Ruiz v. Transportes Aeros Militares Ecuadorianos, 103 F.R.D. 458 (D.D.C.
1984) (citing International Shoe).
265. See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306,
307 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing the circumstances surrounding the bombing).
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flight the plane was still over land when the explosion occurred. '
Two hundred and seventy people were killed, of which one hundred
and eighty-nine were Americans, including airline employees and
thirty-nine Syracuse University students returning home from a se-
mester abroad. 267
The two Libyan suspects, Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi and Lamen
Khalifa Fhimah, both former Libyan intelligence agents, surrendered
in April 1999, thereby ending seven years of United Nations sanc-
tions against Libya.26 The two are currently being held in the Neth-
erlands, where they will be tried under Scottish law. :  Although the
trial could have gotten underway as early as August, lawyers for the
two men have sought extensions, which may push the start date back
as much as a year.270 The trial is also expected to last up to a year.!"
The suspects face a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, as
Scotland has no death penalty.' n
Two individuals who lost their wives on the flight brought suit in
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York."
The court held that the plaintiffs lacked jurisdiction under the FSIA
and dismissed the case.274 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed,
noting in particular that violation of a jus cogens norm did not con-
stitute an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.2"
266. See id. (providing background information).
267. See McKay, supra note 5, at 440 and accompanying text (discussing the
bombing's deadly consequences).
268. See Anthony Deutsch, Libya Delivers Bomb Suspects; Sanctions Off,
ATLANTA J. & CoNsT., Apr. 6, 1999, at A3 (reporting on the suspension of sanc-
tions against Libya after the country handed over the two bombing suspects).
269. See Anthony Deutsch, Lockerbie Bombing Suspects Arraigned, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Apr. 7, 1999, at A3 (describing the trial).
270. See Deutsch, supra note 268, at A3 (speculating on the commencement of
the trial).
271. See id. (reporting on the expected length of the trial).
272. See Deutsch, supra note 268, at A3 (remarking on Scottish criminal law).
273. See Smith, 886 F. Supp. at 306 (identifying the plaintiffs).
274. See id. at 315 (reasoning that it did not have authority sua sponte to assume
jurisdiction based upon a violation ofjus cogens).
275. See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239,
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D. THE AMENDED FSIA
In response to the court's decision in Smith, the terrorism ex-
ception was added to the FSIA as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996, signed into law by President
Clinton on April 23, 1996.76 The pertinent section of the amendment
adds a new section (7) to section 1605, providing that a foreign state
shall not be immune from jurisdiction in a suit.
77
1. Terrorism
The United States Code defines terrorism as an activity that:
involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States
or of any State; and appears to be intended:
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population...;
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnap-
278ping....
242-47 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting the claim that ajus cogens violation constitutes an
implied waiver of sovereign immunity under the FSIA).
276. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(7) (Supp. 11 1996); see also David Mackusisick,
Human Rights vs. Sovereign Rights: The State Sponsored Terrorism Exception to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 741 (1996) (iden-
tifying the amendment to the FSIA).
277. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(7) (Supp. 11 1996).
278. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3077. An exact definition of terrorism is difficult to obtain.
See McKay, supra note 5, at 464-66 and accompanying text (noting the ambiguity
inherent in providing definitions for "international terrorism"); Jordan J. Paust,
Federal Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Acts of Terrorism and Nonimmunity/[br
Foreign Violators of International Law Under the FSIA and the Act of State Doc-
trine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 191, 192-93 (1983) (defining terrorism). Paust states that
terrorism is
a process that involves the intentional use of violence, or threat of violence,
against an instrumental target in order to communicate to a primary target a
threat of future violence so as both to coerce the primary target into behavior
or attitudes through intense fear or anxiety and to serve a particular political
end.
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For purposes of this discussion, the key aspect of terrorism is that
the act can take place completely outside the boundaries of the
United States and be intended to have an effect on persons within the
United States or to have an effect on United States foreign policy,
presumably a change in favor of the state sponsor of that terrorism.
2. State Sponsors of Terrorism
States may be denominated as state sponsors of terrorism by the
Secretary of State under the Export Administration Act of 19792' or
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.2'0 In both cases the same phrase,
"repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism," is
the Secretary's benchmark.2 ' Currently Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are included; however, there are some
obvious political omissions to this list, such as Chile and Saudi Ara-
bia.m Thus, the Rein court's interpretation of the FSIA equates the
decision to deny agricultural assistance or refusing to send Peace
Corps volunteers to a country with the creation of constitutionally
supportable personal jurisdiction in the United States!f"
Also problematic is the fact that under either the Export Admini-
stration Act or the Foreign Assistance Act, the Secretary may de-
nominate a state as a state sponsor of terrorism for international ter-
279. 50 U.S.C. sec. 24056). The Act requires United States exporters to obtain a
validated license to export goods or technology to a country if the Secretary of
State has determined, inter alia, that "such country has repeatedly provided sup-
port for acts of international terrorism." 50 U.S.C. App. sec. 24050)( 1 )(A).
280. 22 U.S.C. sec. 2371. The Act states that the United States shall not provide
assistance under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,
7 U.S.C. see. 1691 etseq., The Peace Corps Act, 22 U.S.C. sec. 2501 etseq. or the
Export-Import Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. sec. 635 et seq., to any country if the Secretary
has determined that "such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of in-
ternational terrorism." 22 U.S.C. sec. 237 1(a).
281. See supra notes 279-280.
282. See Mackusisck, supra note 276, at 770 (noting that the plaintiff, De
Letelier, would have benefited in De Letetier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d. 790
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985) and the plaintiff Nelson would
have benefited in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) had their countries
been on the list).
283. Cf supra notes 279-280 (claiming the decision in Rein analogous to the
statutory provisions).
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rorist activities aimed at countries other than the United States.14 For
example, an Arab state might receive the denomination for what the
Secretary might characterize as repeated terrorist attacks against Is-
rael. 28 ' Here the "effects" on the United States would be even further
removed from the requirements of "minimum contacts., 286 Certainly
such a terrorist state has not purposely availed itself of the privileges
and protections of United States laws, nor would it anticipate being
haled into a United States court.287
E. REIN V. SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LI YAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA
The plaintiffs subsequently refiled in Rein, naming as defendants
the state of Libya, the Libyan External Security Organization, Libyan
Arab Airlines, and Abdel Basset Ali Megrahi, and Lamen Khalifa
Fhimah. 88
The District Court, after first concluding that subject matter juris-
diction was appropriately obtained under the amended FSIA, 8' next
turned to the question of personal jurisdiction. The District Court re-
lied improperly on Texas Trading as the sole support for the propo-
sition that under the FSIA the question of whether or not there is per-
sonal jurisdiction over an absent defendant is governed, not by the
Constitution, but rather by the simple formula: "subject-matter juris-
diction together with proper service of process gives the court per-
sonal jurisdiction."290
The District Court also relied improperly on Burger King for the
proposition that the question was "whether the effects of a foreign




288. See Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 325 (listing the defendants). In discussing Rein
the term "defendants" or "Libya" will hereinafter be used to represent all of the de-
fendants.
289. See Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 96-CV-2077 (TCP)
at 7-8 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (mem.) [hereinafter Memorandum and Order] (noting that
the FSIA simply "recognizes and prescribes" subject matter jurisdiction).
290. See Memorandum and Order, supra note 289, at 8 (citing Texas Trading,
647 F.2d at 308 and failing to conduct a constitutional analysis).
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state's actions upon the United States are sufficient to provide a 'fair
warning' such that the foreign state may be subject to the jurisdiction
of courts in the United States." 29' Finally, and central to this analysis,
the court chose to extend Calder from the interstate tort of libel to
the international tort of terrorism, quoting Calder's "expressly aimed
at" language as dispositive.) '
The Second Circuit affirmed,293 finding that the court had subject
matter jurisdiction, but dismissed all other issues raised for lack of
jurisdiction on the appeal because it was interlocutory in nature.-
Thus, the court did not reach the question, which is the focus of this
analysis, of whether due process allows a court to assert personal ju-
risdiction over a state sponsor of terrorism without the requisite
"minimum contacts" analysis.
Ill.THE AMENDED FSIA VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
This section argues first, that a foreign sovereign is entitled to the
protections of due process, second, that a foreign sovereign is enti-
tled to heightened deference in the personal jurisdiction calculus and
291. See Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 330, citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 (noting
that the teaching of World-Wide Volkswagen is that foreseeability alone is not
enough to confer personal jurisdiction). Unlike Rein, the Court in Burger King was
presented with an array of contacts between the foreign defendant and the state,
including, inter alia, the fact that the contract had a Florida choice of law provi-
sion, one defendant went to seminars in Florida, payments went to Florida, super-
vision was from Florida and a twenty-year relationship with the Florida corpora-
tion was planned. See generally id. at 464-68 (discussing the contacts). In addition,
there were foreseeable injuries to Burger King in Florida, but these were not re-
mote or secondary, but rather a direct economic impact on Burger King. See supra
text accompanying notes 96-115 (discussing the injuries). Finally, in Rein, there
was no foreseeability, as the state sponsor of terrorism exception did not exist
when the bombing took place.
292. See id. at 330, citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789 (noting that Libya is charged
with intentional rather than negligent tortious acts).
293. 162 F.3d 748 (2d Cir.), aff'g 995 F. Supp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), cert. de-
nied, 119 S. Ct. 2337 (1999).
294. See Rein, 162 F.3d at 753-54 (dismissing Libya's claim for lack of personal
jurisdiction and Libya's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to
failure of its jurisdictional challenges).
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third, that the two-tiered analysis is applicable to specific personal
jurisdiction cases. The section also explains why the amended FSIA,
as interpreted in Rein, actually attempts to create general personal ju-
risdiction, and shows why this interpretation does not yield constitu-
tionally permissible personal jurisdiction.
A. A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IS ENTITLED TO DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court has assumed that foreign sovereigns are pro-
tected by due process in American courts but has not decided the is-
sue. 95 The cases on point are few because prior to Shaffer v. Heitner,
most suits against foreign sovereigns were brought quasi in rem and
it was not until Shaffer that quasi in rem cases received "minimum
296contacts" scrutiny. The Second Circuit, where the Rein battle was
set, squarely held in Texas Trading that foreign states are entitled to
the protections of the Due Process Clause, specifically those protec-
tions that the Supreme Court has articulated in the area of personal
• • . • 297
jurisdiction.
295. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 619 (1992) (assum-
ing, but not deciding, that for purposes of Due Process, a foreign state is a "per-
son").
296. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977); Texas Trading, 647 F.2d
at 313 (noting that the due process clause was applied to quasi in rem suits one
year after FSIA was passed).
297. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308, 313, citing Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v.
Compagnie Nat'l Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting
that the court applied constitutional due process analysis in Amoco, a quasi in rem
suit filed before the enactment of the FSIA and decided after Shaffer); see also
Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that United
States district courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Republic of Bo-
livia consistent with due process, in an action brought against Bolivia arising out of
Bolivia's issuance of negotiable promissory notes to its United States agents and
their subsequent delivery involved the requisite contact); Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp.
v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980)
(concluding that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over an
autonomous institution of the Republic of Costa Rica, which regularly engaged in
business agreements with the plaintiff, a California resident, for purchases of
grain); Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir. 1964) (holding that con-
sistent with Hanson, an Argentinean company engaging in business transactions in
the United States, did nothing to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of en-
gaging in business in the forum state); Rovin Sales Co. v. Socialist Republic of
Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (concluding that a foreign
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B. A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IS ENTITLED TO HEIGHTENED
DEFERENCE IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION CLAIMS
Regarding personal jurisdiction over foreign entities, one court
warned that "[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when ex-
tending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international
field,"298and that "a foreign nation presents a higher sovereignty bar-
tier [to the exercise of personal jurisdiction] than that between two
states.,, 299 Further, when dealing with personal jurisdiction under the
FSIA, the Second Circuit has held that a "closer nexus than the
'minimum contacts' is necessary for due process.""' The Court ob-
served in Asahi that the interests of other nations as well the Federal
Government's interest in its foreign relations policies will be best
served by a careful inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of
jurisdiction in the particular case, and an unwillingness to find the se-
rious burdens on an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests
on the part of the plaintiff or the forum state.-'
country and its agents and agencies were subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois by
way of their transaction of business in the forum state and the commission of tor-
tious acts there which were characterized as breach of a wine distributorship
agreement and failure to deliver wines); T.J. Stevenson & Co. v. 81,193 Bags of
Wheat Flour, 399 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Ala. 1975) (holding that contacts of Bo-
livia with the state of Alabama are sufficient to create personal jurisdiction pursu-
ant to the state long-arm statute and the "minimum contacts" standard).
298. L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp. 114,
125 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), quoting Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 115, quoting United States
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
299. L'Europeenne de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 125, quoting Bellante, Clauss,
Miller& Partners v. Alireza, 634 F. Supp. 519, 527 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
300. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991); see
also Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 315 n.37, citing Leasco Data Processing v. Max-
well, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972), citing Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald
T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1121, 1127 (1996) (noting that personal jurisdiction, in an international context,
must be applied with caution); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974,
1000 (2d Cir. 1975) (suggesting that the effect within the state must occur "as a
direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory").
301. Asahi Metal, 480 U.S. at 115.
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C. MINIMUM CONTACTS TIER ANALYSIS
Prior to the state sponsors of terrorism amendment to the FSIA, a
majority of courts construing section 1330 of the FSIA concluded
that Due Process requirements needed to be met.0 2 As a threshold
matter, a court needs to determine whether the "minimum contacts"
analysis is performed separately for each defendant or collectively
for all of the defendants as a group.0 3 In addition, it is noteworthy
that the more contacts that are found, the less likely it is that the fair-
ness tier will weigh against jurisdiction, and conversely, the weaker
the contacts, the greater the likelihood that fairness will dictate
against jurisdiction.4
The Supreme Court has noted, but has not reached, the question of
whether, in the case of a foreign entity, "minimum contacts" are
measured by reference to that entity's contacts with the United States
as a whole or rather those solely with the forum state."' In a separate
case, Justice Stewart argued, in dissent, that the "minimum contacts"
standard should be evaluated by contact with each individual state.''
The majority view, however, seems to be that the contacts to be con-
sidered are national in scope, not merely those with the state in
302. See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 300 (determining that section 1330 of the
FSIA required a due process reasonableness analysis); see also Weltover, 753 F.
Supp. at 1201 (discussing the constitutional requisites for personal jurisdiction).
But see Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1013 (concluding that Bolivia was subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States under the "commercial activity" exception to FSIA);
Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985) (determining that the
cause of action arose as a result of "commercial activity" within the meaning of
that exception to FSIA).
303. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 79 (discussing the proper way to handle the analy-
sis).
304. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 568-
69 (2d Cir. 1996) (adding that, depending on the strength of a defendant's contacts,
the reasonableness component of the Due Process test will have greater or lesser
effect).
305. See Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5
(1987) (noting that, similar to Asahi Metals, the court did not decide the issue).
306. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum state
are all that is needed for due process).
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which the federal court sits.07
Finally, the court must have personal jurisdiction over each defen-
dant individually, not all defendants collectively." The FSIA cannot,
consistent with the Due Process Clause, change black letter rules of
law regarding the personal jurisdiction of the courts." Nonetheless,
the ambiguously worded amendment has caused a great deal of con-
fusion. For example, American Jurisprudence on International Law
(Second) is wrong when it concludes that:
Inquiry into personal jurisdiction over a foreign state need not consider
the rubric of "minimum contacts;" the concept of "minimum contacts" is
inherently subsumed within the exceptions to immunity defined by the
Federal Sovereign Immunities Act. Thus, the minimum contacts test is in-
applicable to foreign sovereigns because Congress intended the courts to
apply a more strict standard under the FSIA when exercising personal ju-
risdiction over a foreign sovereign."'"
307. See L'Europeenne de Banque v. La Republica de Venezuela, 700 F. Supp.
114, 124 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), citing Max Daetwyler Corp., 762 F.2d at 293
(stating that personal jurisdiction requires an inquiry only into the totality of a de-
fendant's contacts throughout the United States); see also Graham E. Lilly, Juris-
diction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. REv. 85, 130 (1983)
(noting that the FSIA makes it reasonably clear that national, as opposed to state,
contacts are decisive for personal jurisdiction, thus illustrating Congress' intent for
conferring personal jurisdiction). But see Pioneer Properties, Inc. v. Martin, 557 F.
Supp. 1354, 1358-61 (D. Kan. 1983) (undertaking a comprehensive due process
inquiry in determining whether the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction,
specifically addressing the defendant's contacts in Kansas rather than the defen-
dant's national contacts).
308. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 790, citing Rush v. Sauvchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332
(1980) (maintaining the due process requirement as it relates to each defendant set
forth in International Shoe when addressing whether or not the defendant's status
as employees insulates them from jurisdiction).
309. See L'Europeenne de Banque, 700 F. Supp. at 122, quoting Teras Trading,
647 F.2d at 308 (stating that the FSIA cannot create personal jurisdiction where the
Constitution forbids it.); see also Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 682 F.2d 1022,
1028-29 (D.C. Cir. 1982), citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, art. 6 (1976) (stressing
that Congress passed FSIA to ensure that residents of a state have access to the
courts in order to resolve "ordinary legal issues").
310. 45 AM. JUR. 2D INT'L LAW sec. 97 (1999), citing Flatow v. Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998); see Southway v. Central Bank of Nige-
ria, 994 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Colo. 1998)
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Moreover, the victims' American nationality alone cannot furnish
the requisite "minimum contacts" with the United States, permitting
the prosecution of the instant action." While nationality does fre-
quently have dispositive significance in dealing with legal claims on
an international level, for example, it is a prerequisite for the diplo-
matic espousal of claims between states, it has no bearing on a
court's personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Similarly,
in Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 12 the court held that jurisdictional con-
tacts with the United States were purely fortuitous "where they de-
pend solely on the fact that the injured person happened to be Ameri-
can."
Using Libya as an example, the fact that it is denominated as a
state sponsor of terrorism and ostracized by the United States limits
its ability to acquire "minimum contacts" with the United States.
Libya is denied the opportunity to purposefully avail itself of the
privileges and protections of United States laws."' Libya has been
precluded from entering into the stream of commerce of the United
States.1 Accordingly, Libya could not, at least prior to the adoption
of the "state sponsor of terrorism" exception to the FSIA adopted
after the bombing of Flight 103, foresee being haled into a United
States court."' Thus, the only contact is a Calder-style "effect" based
on the alleged terrorist incident.
D. CALDER ALONE DOES NOT SUPPORT JURISDICTION
The Lockerbie plaintiffs, and anyone else seeking to gain personal
jurisdiction by reference solely to the FSIA, therefore, are left with
311. See Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp., 614 F.2d, at 1253-55 (noting that the "mini-
mum contacts" standard is not satisfied when the only link to the United States fo-
rum is the nationality or residence of the plaintiff).
312. 764 F.2d at 1111.
313. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (noting that the Calder court
held that lack of physical presence in the state does not prevent jurisdiction where
the actor's efforts are purposefully directed toward the state's residents).
314. See supra notes 114, 115 and accompanying text (discussing the "contacts
plus" analysis).
315. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting that Asahi Metal stands
for the proposition that foreseeability alone cannot offer jurisdiction).
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just the support of Calder, for the proposition, entirely novel in in-
ternational law, that a tortious act of physical violence outside a na-
tion nevertheless gives rise to personal jurisdiction over absent de-
fendants within that nation because the aim of the act was to
somehow create effects within the nation. Calder, however, cannot
bear this burden alone.
In Rein, the District Court cited Calder for the proposition that
Libya is charged "not 'with mere untargeted negligence,' but rather
intentional, tortious actions that 'were expressly aimed at' the United
States."3'16 But Calder is not similar to the Lockerbie case. First, and
most obviously, Calder does not involve international defendants, a
fact which, as discussed above, changes the "minimum contacts"
calculus.317
Second, although the so-called "effects test" employed by the
California court was apparently cited with approval by the Supreme
Court in Calder, the Supreme Court did so only after it stated that the
defendant National Enquirer, sold more than 600,000 papers a week
in California, almost twice the number of the next highest state, and
that defendant South, a National Enquirer reporter, traveled to Cali-
fornia more than twenty times in the previous four years and relied
on phone calls to sources in California for the story.'" If the Califor-
nia court's "effects test" had alone satisfied due process, the Su-
preme Court would not have needed to address the kinds of contacts
it addressed, namely those that are measured in a traditional mini-
mum contacts analysis.1 9
Third, Calder involved a direct injury to an individual living in the
forum state, specifically, the injury was to a Californian, because the
tortious act affected her ability to successfully work in California, as
a direct result of potential in-state employers reading the California-
based article.320 The Court concluded that "[t]he brunt of the harm, in
316. Rein, 995 F. Supp. at 330, citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789.
317. See Calder, 465 U.S. at 785-86 (discussing the parties to the action).
318. See id. at 785 (discussing the background of the alleged tortious acts).
319. See id. (listing the contacts addressed by the court).
320. See id. at 788-89 (holding that jurisdiction is proper over the defendants
because their intentional conduct in California was alleged to have caused injury).
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terms both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her
professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, Califor-
nia is the focal point both of the story and the harm suffered."32'
Finally, it is significant that the tort responsible for the suit in Cal-
der was one that traditionally sounded in case, whereas Libya's al-
leged actions would have traditionally sounded in trespass. 22 The
distinction is more than academic. Libya's alleged actions were di-
rect and forcible injuries to the passengers of Pan Am Flight 103 as a
result of the direct and immediate application of force to them." In-
juries suffered by the passengers were quite clearly suffered in Scot-
land and thus do not in any way constitute "contacts" with New York
or the United States.324 Any injuries suffered by anyone in the United
States were secondary. By contrast, an injury resulting from any of
the actions which evolved from case, including the libel action
brought in Calder, did not result from the direct and immediate ap-
plication of force. An entirely different issue is presented when an
attempt is made to determine the situs of a tort that involves no
physical contact.325 Tellingly, every one of the cases cited by the
Lockerbie plaintiffs to demonstrate that Calder has been followed
"many times," involved torts that sound in case rather than tres-
pass."' Similar defects are found in the United States' citations to
321. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. But see id. at 789, citing World Wide Volkswagen,
444 U.S. at 279-80 (suggesting that jurisdiction is proper by reference to the "ef-
fects" of petitioners' Florida conduct in California, but then cites to the analysis of
World- Wide Volkswagen for support).
322. See Leame v. Bray, 102 Eng. Rep. 724 (1802) (noting that at English com-
mon law, trespass, originally criminal in nature, would sound for direct and forci-
ble injuries only, all other injuries sounded in case). See generally George E.
Woodbine, The Origin ofAction of Trespass, 33 YALE L.J. 799 (1923) (discussing
the origins of trespass); Statute of 5-6 W. & M., c.12 (abolishing the criminal as-
pect of trespass).
323. See Smith, 886 F. Supp. at 397 (recounting the bombing incident).
324. See id. (providing the location of the bombing).
325. See, e.g., Keeton, 465 U.S. at 776 (involving the tort of libel).
326. See Plaintiffs' Steering Committee's Memorandum of Law in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 31 (citing cases with facts similar to those
presented in Rein); see also United States Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Carillo, 115
F.3d 1540 (11 th Cir. 1997) (finding that a Costa Rican corporation and two of its
officers had sufficient minimum contacts with the United States when they en-
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cases relying on Calder1
27
gaged in fraudulent sales of unregistered securities to United States citizens);
Brainerd v. University of Alta, 873 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding jurisdiction
over Canadian academics who allegedly defamed and breached an agreement with
a former professor); Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1987) (determining that
Idaho had jurisdiction over a California attorney who, through misrepresentation to
a California court, secured an ex parte child custody order); Brown v. Flowers In-
dust., Inc., 688 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983) (es-
tablishing personal jurisdiction by one allegedly defamatory phone call by the out-
of-state defendants to the forum state where the plaintiff resided); Moellers N.
Am., Inc. v. MSK Covertech, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (holding
that jurisdiction was improper); Perez-Rubio v. Wyckoff, 718 F. Supp. 217
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (giving the United States jurisdiction over foreign residents who
engaged in securities fraud); Sluys v. Hand, 831 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(subjecting defendants to jurisdiction in New York because a threatening letter
physically arrived in the forum); LeDuc v. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 814 F.
Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (determining that there was valid personal jurisdiction
over the president of an insurer who authored a fraudulent letter to California poli-
cyholders); Cleopatra Kohlique, Inc. v. New High Glass, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1254
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (determining that the manufacturers' alleged fraud, which caused
injury within the forum state, was sufficient to subject them to jurisdiction under
New York's long arm statute); Stuart v. Federal Energy Sys., 596 F. Supp. 458 (D.
Vt. 1984) (holding that the plaintiff, who alleged that he was defrauded in the pur-
chase of a franchise to sell energy management technology in Vermont and who
alleged that individual defendants personally participated in the transaction causing
his injury, made a prima facie showing of valid personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendants under Vermont's long arm statute).
327. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 20 n.22, 23, citing Hugel v.
McNeill, 886 F.2d 1, 4-5 (lst Cir. 1989). Most peculiar is its citation to Far West
Capital v. Towne, 46 F.3d 1071, 1077-78 (10th Cir. 1995). See id. In Far West
Capital, the alleged torts of breach of contract, intentional interference with con-
tractual relationships and economic duress were insufficient to establish minimum
contacts despite the fact that Calder represented the plaintiff's strongest argument.
See Far West Capital, 46 F.3d at 1077. The Court noted that in Calder "most of
the harm or 'effects' to the plaintiff's reputation and career occurred in California,"
and noted that the Tenth Circuit had applied Calder in a libel claim. See id. at 1077
(citing Burt v. Board of Regents, 757 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1985)). Finally, the court
noted that in a pre-Calder case, the Second Circuit argued that a finding of juris-
diction in a state based on an injury outside the state that had some effect on a
domiciliary of the state, "would open a veritable Pandora's Box of litigation sub-
jecting every conceivable prospective defendant involved in an accident with a
New York domiciliary to defend actions brought against them in the State of New
York." See id. at 1078 (quoting Am. Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron
Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428, 434 (2d Cir. 1971) and Black v. Oberle Rentals, Inc.,
55 Misc. 2d 398, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (1967)). Finally, the United States cites to
Retail Software Servs. v. Lashlee, 854 F.2d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 1988), which provides
no insight whatsoever into the instant case. See Retail Software Sen's., 854 F.2d at
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In sum, because the Rein court declined to do so, no federal court
has applied the minimum contacts test to the alleged supporting na-
tion in a civil suit for an international terrorist act. The Supreme
Court will ultimately be given the opportunity to determine if the
Calder "effects test" provides the appropriate contacts. Plainly, there
was no purposeful availment by Libya.328 Certainly Libya could not
foresee being haled into a federal court,"' since at the time of the
Flight 103 bombing, the state sponsors of terrorism exception to sov-
ereign immunity did not exist and the "stream of commerce" analysis
is inapposite.3 Finally, there was no direct effect aimed at the plain-
tiffs. By its own definition of terrorism, the direct effect, if any, was
on the United States government, and any effects on the individual
plaintiffs were indirect.
E. FAIRNESS TIER ANALYSIS
The Circuits are divided on how to weigh fairness to the defen-
dants when considering jurisdiction.' The Second Circuit consid-
24 (providing that franchise sales from outside the state to franchisees inside the
state were factors that may be considered in assessing minimum contacts).
328. See supra note 111 (noting that the Calder court held that lack of physical
presence in the state does not prevent jurisdiction where the actor's efforts are pur-
posefully directed toward the state's residents).
329. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987) (standing for the proposition that foreseeability alone cannot offer jurisdic-
tion).
330. See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (applying the
"contacts plus" analysis).
331. See Nelson v. R. Greenspan & Co., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 342, 345 (E.D. Mo.
1985), citing Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Diversified Metals Corp., 564 F.2d 1211,
1215 (8th Cir. 1977) (discussing the Eighth Circuit's five-factor fairness test,
which weighs the first three facts as of primary importance and the last two factors
as of secondary importance). Cf Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco
Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 577 (Walker, J., dissenting) (noting that the proliferation of
fairness tests in the circuits has left the state of the law regarding reasonableness
inquiries in disarray). Judge Walker noted that the Ninth Circuit employs a seven-
factor test. See id. (citing Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., I F.3d
848, 851-53 (9th Cir. 1993)). The Sixth Circuit employs a three-pronged balancing
test in which the third factor contains a five-factor reasonableness test. See id. at
578 (citing Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1460-61 (6th Cir. 1991)). The
First Circuit employs a test which considers a "Gestalt" of reasonableness factors.
See id. (citing Donatelli v. National Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir.
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ered seven factors to determine reasonableness: the extent of pur-
poseful injection; the burden on the defendant; the extent of the con-
flict of sovereignty of the defendant's state; the forum state's interest
in the suit; the most efficient judicial resolution of the suit; the con-
venience and effectiveness of relief to the plaintiff, and the existence
of an alternative forum.332
Turning to the first factor, the extent of purposeful injection, the
Ninth Circuit at least, would hold that once the court has concluded
that a defendant has purposefully directed its activities at the forum
state for "minimum contacts" purposes there is no need to further
consider purposeful injection.333 However, this seems to make the
factor superfluous, since the fairness tier is never reached unless
"minimum contacts" are found in the first tier.""
In discussing the second factor, the burden on the defendant,
courts routinely note that "modem advances in communications and
transportation have significantly reduced the burden of litigating in
another country." '335 However, the Sinatra court noted:
The Supreme Court recently reiterated its concern with the burdens of de-
fending a suit in a foreign country. The unique burdens placed upon one
who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant
weight in asserting the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of per-
sonal jurisdiction over national borders. '
Regarding the third factor, the extent of the conflict of sovereignty
1990)). The Fifth Circuit considers a four-factor test. See id. (citing Bearry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987)).
332. See Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1198-99 (9th Cir.
1987), citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (providing multiple factors to consider
when determining reasonableness in the context of personal jurisdiction).
333. See Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199 (asserting that the "'purposeful injectment"
receives no weight once the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant directed its
activities to the forum state).
334. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-99 (1979)
(stating "minimum contacts" were a necessary first step in a two-tiered analysis).
335. See Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199 (discussing the changes that have taken place
in terms of litigation in other countries); see also Metropolitan Life, 84 F.3d at 574.
336. See Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1199 quoting Asahi Metals, 107 S. Ct. at 1034
(discussing the burdens of defending a suit on foreign soil).
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of the defendant's state, the Sinatra court again noted that the Su-
preme Court has "cautioned against extending state long-arm statutes
in an international context.""' 7 The fourth factor is the forum state's
interest in the suit.3 8 The forum state's interest is minimal where it
has been chosen merely because of its longer statute of limitations,
therefore, by analogy, the same reasoning applies where the choice is
based on the potential size of the jury award. " 9 The fifth factor, the
most efficient judicial resolution of the suit, weighs against a United
States forum because witnesses and evidence are primarily located
outside of the United States, and, arguably at least, United States law
would not apply. 40 The sixth factor, the convenience and effective-
ness of relief of the plaintiff obviously weighs in favor of an Ameri-
can forum.3 4' Finally, regarding the seventh factor, the availability of
an alternative forum, such a forum obviously exists in, inter alia,
Scotland.342 Further, it could be argued that international efforts
should be used to combat terrorism and to provide for the victims.
F. GENERAL JURISDICTION IS LACKING
The amended FSIA apparently attempts to create general jurisdic-
tion because prior acts of terrorism that caused a state to be desig-
nated as a "state sponsor of terrorism" create the jurisdiction rather
than the actual act being sued upon. 14 In other words, the commis-
337. Id. The Court stated, "[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when
extending our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field." Asahi
Metal, 107 S. Ct. at 1035, quoting United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S.
378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (expressing the Court's concern for the use
of care when attempting to utilize personal jurisdiction internationally).
338. See Sinatra, 854 F. 2d at 1198-99.
339. See Metropolitan Life, 84 F.3d at 574 (noting that the statute of limitations
is not a permissible consideration when determining jurisdiction).
340. Cf Sinatra, 854 F.2d at 1200 (stating that California would be the most ef-
ficient place for a suit against a Swiss defendant because witnesses and evidence
were in California).
341. See id. at 1198-99 (classifying relief for the plaintiff as a factor to consider
when assessing reasonableness).
342. Albeit one where the damage award, if any, would be much smaller, and
the assets available to attach to it would be less valuable.
343. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. sec.
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sion of "sufficient acts" of terrorism such as to prompt the Secre-
tary of State to denominate the state as a state sponsor of terrorism" '
creates general jurisdiction such that the next act of terrorism, even if
it alone would not have prompted the Secretary to act, subjects the
state to general personal jurisdiction." In fact, to the extent that the
acts of terrorism cited for the decision to name the state a state spon-
sor of terrorism were not at least directed against the United States
(under the government's Calder approach) or done in the United
States, they do not constitute "minimum contacts" under the tradi-
tional formulation.
Though it is questionable whether the fairness prong is applicable
to a general jurisdiction case where "substantial contacts" have been
found, the Second Circuit has answered the question affirmatively." '
Assuming this answer is correct, the same fairness analysis from be-
fore would apply.3
G. ANALOGY TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S LONG-ARM
STATUTE
Construing the FSIA's long-arm statute yields the same result as
does the Due Process analysis since section 1330(b) of the FSIA cre-
ates, in effect, a Federal long-arm statute over foreign states, (in-
cluding political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities of for-
1605(a)(7)(A) (Supp. 1999) (establishing that the United States' courts shall de-
cline to hear a claim if the foreign state is not considered a state sponsor of terror-
ism).
344. See Helicopteros Nationales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,416 (1984)
(determining whether or not contacts were systematic and continuous so as to es-
tablish general jurisdiction).
345. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. sec. 2371(a) (1990) (pro-
viding that the Secretary of State will determine if a country has supported acts of
international terrorism).
346. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1605(a)(7)(A) (suggesting that the classification as a
state sponsor of terrorism enables a country to gain jurisdiction over the defen-
dant).
347. See Metropolitan Life, 84 F.3d at 573 (concluding that the reasonableness
inquiry is applicable to all personal jurisdiction cases, whether general or specific).
348. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985) (listing
the factors of the fairness analysis).
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eign states). 4 1 It is patterned after the long-arm statute Congress en-
acted for the District of Columbia.35 ° The Statute provides that a Dis-
trict of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction where a
tortious injury in the District is caused by a tortious act (or omission)
within the District."' However, where a tortious injury within the
District is caused by an act (or omission) outside the District there is
no personal jurisdiction unless the tortfeasor "regularly does or so-
licits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or serv-
ices rendered, in the District of Columbia.""5 2 The statute has been
held to be co-extensive with the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution.353 Under the statute, the "minimum contacts"
analysis requires that the alleged tortfeasor be found to be regularly
doing or soliciting business within the District, engaging in any other
persistent course of conduct or deriving substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed or services rendered within the District,
5 4
thus, "filter[ing] out cases in which the in-forum impact is an isolated
event and the defendant otherwise has no, or scant, affiliations with
the forum. '355 The contacts must be continual in character.3 6
349. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1330(b) (1993) (extending personal jurisdiction over
states based on their contacts with the United States).
350. See D.C. Court Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 91-358, sec. 132(a) title i, 84 Stat.
473, 549 (1970) (establishing the D.C. long-arm statute).
351. See id. sec. 132(a), sec. 13-423(a)(3), 84 Stat. at 549 (providing the stan-
dard for personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia).
352. See id. sec. 132(a), sec. 13-423(a)(4), 84 Stat. at 549 (setting forth the way
in which personal jurisdiction can be established when the act or omission occurs
outside of the District of Columbia).
353. See Environmental Research, Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc.,
App. D.C., 355 A.2d 808, 810-11 (D.C. 1976) (concluding that the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction should be extended to the limits of the Due Process Clause).
354. See Trager v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 593 F. Supp. 223 (D.D.C. 1984) (pro-
viding three types of "minimum contacts" for the Court to acquire personal juris-
diction over the defendant).
355. See Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (explaining how the
additional analysis in the statute impacts the number of cases in court).
356. See Security Bank, N.A. v. Tauber, 347 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D.D.C. 1984)
(asserting the use of the words "persistent" and "regularly" suggests that Congress
was concerned with continuous contacts).
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In Upton v. Empire of I'an"' two Americans were killed and one
was injured when the Mehrabad International Airport's terminal roof
collapsed.58 Plaintiffs first sued Iran and Iran's Department of Civil
Aviation in the Southern District of New York on the theory that the
defendants were doing business in New York. 5 The District Court
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the Second Circuit affirmed in
an unpublished opinion, allowing plaintiffs to refile under the
FSIA.3'6
Upon refiling in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, the defendants argued both lack of subject matter juris-
diction and lack of personal jurisdiction.'" Citing the House Report
referenced above, the court stated that section 1330(b) of the FSIA
created a long-arm statute patterned after the District of Columbia's
long-arm statute and that the requirements of minimum contacts, as
articulated in International Shoe and Shaffer, were embodied in it. "
Thus, a finding of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA did not
guarantee personal jurisdiction absent a finding of minimum con-
tacts. 3 The court concluded, "causing an injury to American citizens
abroad is insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the District of
Columbia's long-arm statute. '""
357. 459 F. Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), afr'd, 607 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
358. See id. at 264 (stating how the plaintiffs in the case were injured and
killed).
359. See id. (discussing the fact that the plaintiffs originally brought their action
in New York in 1976, before the enactment of the FSIA).
360. See Upton v. Department of Civil Aviation, 76 Civ. 2914 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
affd, F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1977).
361. See Upton v. Iran, 459 F. Supp. at 265 (setting forth the grounds for the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss).
362. See id. at 266 (discussing the FSIA in terms of the drafter's intent and its
legislative history).
363. See id. (stating that "minimum contacts" are required in order to obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction).
364. See id., citing Leaks v. Ex-Lax, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1976) (as-
serting that suffering pain in the District, caused by an injury outside the District,
does satisfy "minimum contacts"); Norair Engineering Assocs., Inc. v. Noland,
365 F. Supp. 740, 743 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that an injury outside the District
that required expenditures within the District did not create personal jurisdiction);
see also EI-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (as-
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H. TEXAS TRADING DOES NOT SUPPORT JURISDICTION
The Lockerbie plaintiffs were clearly erroneous when they as-
serted that Texas Trading supports the case for personal jurisdiction
and the District Court was wrong to follow their lead. Perhaps the
court below was misled by plaintiffs' grossly erroneous misquotation
from Texas Trading."' The plaintiffs quoted the Second Circuit as
stating, "[t]he Act... makes the statutory aspect of personal juris-
diction simple: subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process
equals personal jurisdiction." '366 The plaintiffs, however, failed to
continue the quote, which, after a citation to the House Report, con-
tinues with the very next sentence: "but, the Act cannot create per-
sonal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it. Accordingly,
each finding of personal jurisdiction under the FSIA requires, in ad-
dition, a due process scrutiny of the court's power to exercise its
authority over a particular defendant. 3 67 The FSIA assures that
where there is subject matter jurisdiction and proper service of proc-
ess, the Act itself will provide no further impediment to personal ju-
risdiction.368 In other words, the provision means that where there is
subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant under the Act, the re-
quirements of the state's long-arm statute need not be met.3 69 Re-
serting that there was no personal jurisdiction where a person living and working
in Jordan was injured there and the only contact with the District was the fact that
his employer's principal place of business was there, even though the defendant's
conduct was not directed at the District).
365. See supra notes 245-60 and accompanying text (discussing the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause under Texas Trading).
366. Plaintiffs Steering Committee's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to De-
fendants' Motion to Dismiss at 27, citing Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 306 (defining
personal jurisdiction under the FSIA).
367. See Statement of Interest of the United States, supra note 248 at 17-18
(recognizing that the legislative history indicates a desire to utilize a "minimum
contacts" analysis).
368. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 1330(b) (establishing that "personal jurisdiction over a
foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts
have subject matter jurisdiction.., where service has been made under 28 U.S.C.
sec. 1608").
369. See Vermeulen v. Renault, 985 F.2d 1534, 1552 (11 th Cir. 1993) (opining
that "minimum contacts" with the forum state, as opposed to the United States as a
whole, are not necessarily required to comport with due process).
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gardless, the Act cannot create personal jurisdiction where the Con-
stitution forbids it.370
Texas Trading, although alone sufficient to demonstrate that the
FSIA requires a "minimum contacts" analysis before personal juris-
diction will be found, has substantial support in the lower courts.''
370. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d
300, 313, n.36 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that the requirements of the FSIA are subject
to the constitutional limitations of due process).
371. See Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1107 n.5 (5th Cir. 1985),
citing Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308 (stating that personal jurisdiction must com-
port with the due process clause); Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de
Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that
personal jurisdiction under the FSIA requires the traditional "minimum contacts");
Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A., Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1545 (11 th Cir. 1993) cert. de-
nied, 508 U.S. 907 (1999), citing Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314 (affirming the
"minimum contacts" requirement); Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Americas,
Inc., v. Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo, 485 F. Supp. 492-93 (E.D. Wisc.
1980) (applying a "minimum contacts" analysis in order to assess personal juris-
diction under the Act); Ruiz v. Transportes Aereos Militares Ecuadorianos, 103
F.R.D. 458, 459 (D.D.C. 1984) (framing the defendant's assertions that due proc-
ess is not altered when jurisdiction is asserted under the Act); see also Shapiro v.
Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1020 (2d Cir. 1991), citing Teas Trading,
647 F.2d at 314 (affirming the "minimum contacts" requirement); Geveke & Co.
Int'l, Inc. v. Kompania Di Awa I Elektrisdat Di Korsou N.V., 482 F. Supp. 660,
663 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that in personam jurisdiction can be obtained if there
are sufficient commercial contacts to satisfy the requirements of due process);
Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1979) (asserting that a de-
fendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state in order to satisfy the
requirements of Due Process); Maritime Ventures Int'l, Inc. v. Caribbean Trading
& Fidelity, Ltd., 689 F. Supp. 1340, 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), reconsideration de-
nied, 722 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (asserting that any exercise of jurisdic-
tion under the Act must satisfy the requirement of due process); Weltover, Inc. v.
Republic of Argentina, 753 F. Supp. 1201, 1207-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aItd, 941
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991), aft'd, 504 U.S. 607 (1992) (applying a four part test to as-
sess the defendant's contacts with the United States). In Weltover, even though it
had concluded that Argentina's commercial activities had a direct effect on the
United States and, thus there was subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, the
United States Supreme Court nevertheless felt itself compelled to perform the
minimum contacts test to determine if Argentina was subject to personal jurisdic-
tion. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619-20 (concluding that the defendant "purpose-
fully availed" himself to the forum and thus, possessed the requisite "minimum
contacts" with the United States).
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I. OTHER DEFECTS AS APPLIED TO LIBYA
Libya has preserved the issues that the FSIA, as amended, is both
an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder. 7 ' The Court of Appeals
noted the two arguments but held that "those issues are not properly
before us at this stage of the case, 373 for similar reasons. Accord-
ingly, the court of appeals has not yet determined if Libya will be
held to owe punitive damages under section 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA,
and both the bill of attainder and ex post facto law analysis is only
germane to punitive laws.374 Finally, forum non conveniens argu-
ments may also be germane if personal jurisdiction is held to have
been established.
CONCLUSION
There can be no debate that the perpetrators who bombed Flight
103 should be brought to justice. Even though it took years of United
Nations legal sanctions against Libya to bring the two individual de-
fendants to trial, their criminal trial is at last imminent. Likewise, the
victims are entitled to monetary compensation and they are, there-
fore, entitled to a forum in which to press their civil claims. The
same is true of all American victims of international terrorism and
their survivors, regardless of whether the terrorist act was perpetrated
by an individual, one of the six states designated as "state sponsors
of terrorism" or by some other state or quasi-state. Perhaps the best
way to battle terrorism is through international efforts and agree-
ments. Perhaps the worst way is to tamper with the test for the con-
stitutional assertion of personal jurisdiction, which has developed in
the decades between International Shoe375 and Asahi. 76 Congress
372. See U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 3 (stating Congress shall pass no ex post
facto laws or bills of attainder); U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1 (stating states
shall pass no ex post facto laws or bills of attainder).
373. See Rein, 162 F.3d at 762 (stating that due to the fact that there has been no
trial on the merits and no finding of liability, the question of a bill of attainder or
an ex post facto law cannot yet be determined).
374. See id. at 761-62 (noting that Libya's argument for lack of jurisdiction is
only applicable on the context of punitive damages).
375. See supra text accompanying notes 33-43 (discussing the jurisdiction re-
quirements put forth in International Shoe).
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simply cannot award the federal district courts personal jurisdiction
by enacting a new law. Instead, "minimum contacts" must be found
via the traditional test. Neither should the court extend the Calder
"effects" test,3" which has been applied almost exclusively to defa-
mation torts and has been narrowly construed and questioned since it
was announced, into the area of international terrorist activity. Un-
fortunately, state sponsors of terrorism are entitled to due process too
and should not be haled into United States federal courts absent the
necessary contacts.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 116-36 (providing Justice O'Connor's
assessment of the "minimum contacts" analysis in Asahi Metal).
377. See supra text accompanying notes 140-52 (discussing the Supreme
Court's analysis of the defendant's contacts with the forum state in Calder).
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